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• SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO EQUITY AND VENTURE CAP IT AI-' 
THURSDAY, MAY 12, 1977 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT 
AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 
Washington, D.O. 
The subcommittee met at 9 :30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in B-313, 
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J . LaFalce (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding. 
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LaFALCE 
Mr. LAF ALCE. I understand other members o:f the subcommittee are 
on their way here. The ranking minority member, Mr. Stanton, is at 
the White House right now and should be here shortly, but because I 
am anxious to proceed on this important issue I am going to take the 
liberty of proceeding, in anticipation that the other members will 
be walking in shortly. 
'First of all, I want to apologize for the room but I did want to 
begin hearings immediately. We delayed them somewhat :from a previ-
ous tentative date, and this is the only room available this entire week. 
There are so many hearings going on, at least at a time when I would 
'
able to convene the hearmg. 
My secretary just walked in with my briefcase and told me that 
e was in the elevator with Charlton Heston. She advised me that the 
hearing room where he is testifying is considerably larger. I am not 
sure that the issue is larger but the interest in him is a little greater 
than the interest in this proceeding. 
On the other hand, the smallness o:f the room will provide us with a 
certain informality. 
This morning the subcommittee commences its exploration of the 
venture and equity capital markets accessible to the small business 
community. The availability o:f different types o:f capital for small 
enterprises is perhaps the single-most important subject matter within 
our jurisdiction, and the subject is all the more compelling due to 
widespread evidence that the availability o:f essential capital for new 
and growing concerns is not keeping pace with the demand. 
The SBA has quite naturally been very concerned about the shrink-
age of capital supply, and last year commissioned a special task force 
to analyze the causes of the shortage of venture and equity capital and 
develop some proposals to help ameliorate the current situation. "The 
(1) 
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Report of the SBA Task Force on Venture and Equity Capital for 
Small Business," which was published in January of this year, pro-
vides the subcommittee with an excellent departure point for further 
discussion on this problem area. I would like to congratulate the me. 
hers of the task force, a good number of whom are here this mornirr 
as well as the SBA personnel who worked wii.th them, for an excellent 
job in coming to grips with the difficult issues and advancing some 
wo11thwhile proposals. 
There are essentially three principal sources of venture capital for 
small businesses: The private savii.ngs of the individual businessman; 
private venture capital investment companies; and the small business 
investment companies licensed by the SBA. 
Because the small innovative entrepreneur is typically wiithout siz-
able assets and cannot demonstrate a proven track record, alt least inso-
far as his new product development is concerned, he is hard-pressed to 
obta·in the type of long-term capital with flexible terms that he needs 
from commercial banks. Most banks make strictly short-term loans of 
3 years max·imum with fixed principal and interest repayment terms. 
Further, most banks prefer ito stay away from lending to relatively new 
companies whose products are untested in the marketplace. 
As a result, t he businessman seeking investment capital for a new or 
growing venture must seek the capital he needs in a rather narrow mar-
ketplace. It is of great concern to this subcommittee that this market-
place appears rto be narrowing even further, to the point perhaps of 
extinction. 
It is significant, I think, that in their report the task force noted 
.that the number of stock offerings made by companies having net worth 
of $5 million or less has fallen drastically from 548 offerings in 1969 to 
only 4 in 1975. That statistic frightened me. The data is frightening in 
terms of the staJtement ii.t makes about the capacity of our risk capital 
markets to sustain and nurture small firms that have the potential for 
tremendous expansion and concomitant job creation. 
In these hearings, the subcommittee will focus on the impediments 
blocking reasonable access to venture and equity cai;>ital for the sm. 
business concern. \Ve wrill also be interested in explormg the limitati 
on the types of small firms that do have access to eq_ui~y capital. It I~a 
been estimated that well over 50 percent of the ex1stmg stock of n sk 
capital that has been available .to small firms has been channeled to 
companies having high technology orientations. 
In our commitment to address these issues in a constructive fashion 
we are joined by the Small Business Administration. I am delighted 
that the agency's new Administrator, Mr. A. Vernon Weaver, has 
recognized and stated that "The most important financial problem 
small business faces today is the lack of access to venture and equity 
capital." It is my sincere hope that the subcommittee will be able to 
work closely with the Administrator and the agency to jointly con-
sider and initiate the types of legislative and regulatory modifications 
that may be necessary to improve the investment climate for small 
business concerns. 
Mr. Stanton, the ranking minority member, did have a prepared 
statement. In his absence I would ask Mr. Kasten to read it for him. 
Mr. KASTEN. Thank you. I am very glad that you have scheduled 
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hearin<YS on one of the most important problems confronting the 
small business community today. If free enterprise is desirable, and 
most of us here think that it is, it certainly needs strengthening. Prob-
•~ly the last remaining real entrepreneur is the small businessman. He the one taking the risk. He is the capitalist. We certainly should try to find ways to encourage and promote the availability of capital 
for him. 
The key to the future economic well-being of the United States lies 
in increased capital formation, that is, the investment of savings in 
factories, equipment, and new technology. These are productive in-
vestments, and are the source of jobs and income. 
I am confident that the distinguished list of witnesses who will 
testify before us on this matter can shed light on the problem and 
ad vise us in .finding a proper path through the thicket of laws and 
regulations so that we might make it easier for our enterprising busi-
ness people to do the things that will pro.fit them, and in so doing 
provide work for others and thereby help our country. 
Mr. LAFALCE. Mr. Weaver? 
TESTIMONY OF A. VERNON WEAVER, ADMINISTRATOR, SMALL 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY PETER McNEISH, 
ACTING ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT 
Mr. WEAVER. Thank you. On my right is Pete McNeish, Acting As-
sociate Administrator for Finance and Investment which had a lot 
to do with the task force. 
Mr. Chairman, I have said previously that the lack of capital op-
portunities for small business is the most important .financial factor. 
For that reason I have a relatively long statement and at your pleas-
ure I will read only parts. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Without objection, it will be placed in the record. 
[The full prepared statement follows:] 
. EPARED STATEMENT OF A . VERNON WEAVER, ADMINISTRATOR, SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION 
i\Ir. Chairman and Members of t he Subcommittee: I welcome the opportunity 
to appear as the first witness before this newly established Subcommittee on 
Capital, Investment and Business Opportunit:ies. 
Let me say first-as I did in my initial hearing before the full House Com-
mittee on Small Business-that I look fonva rd to a frank, open and straight-
forward relationship with eac'h of you and with the Subcommittee. 
Y'Ou are to be commended for t'he establishment of this new Subcommittee 
which will focus on the issue of investment capital for small business. 
As I have already indicated on several occasions in my previous testimony, in 
my view the most important financial problem small business faces today is 
the lack of access to venture and equity capital. 
THE NEED FOR RISK CAPITAL 
The Venture and Equity Task Force did an excellent job in analyzing this 
problem and presenting it in clear and precise terms. 
Their report was completed in January of this year, and transmitted by my 
predecessor to each member 'Of the Small Business Committees of the House 
and Senate, other l:!ommittees of the Congress having :an interest in the subject 
and to key officials in tlle Executive Branch . 
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In summary, the Task Force has told us that in today's financial market-
place a series of serious impediments preclude small business from competitive 
access to needed capital. 
As a result of recent economic experiences, private investors-indiTiduals 
w'h10 were .once a vital source of funds for new businesses~have become qm. 
reluctant to provide risk funds for new or growing small businesses. And tl 
situation is further compounded by legislation and regulations which are d1 
incentives to risk sharing. 
Public offerings by small companies have all but dried up in recent years, and 
this has been further compounded by the skyrocketing costs of entering the 
public markets. 
At the same time, the trend toward concentration of funds in larger institu-
tional investors is clear. Because these institutions either follow relatively 
conservative investment policies, or are restricted by governmentally imposed 
investment standards, the net result is a further restriction on access to these 
funds by small business ventures. 
I won't go further in elaborating on the clear picture painted by the '!.'ask 
Force. The net reality, however, is that small business is slowly being fore-
closed from access to "risk capital" which is ·desperately needed for starti11g 
and expanding those small companies. 
As President Carter has told me, more loans-or more debt capital-is not 
what an already overly debt-burdened company needs. More loans will simply 
put these companies out of business. What they need is some form of risk capital 
that will stay with these companies over time and help assure their orderly 
growth. 
THE CHALLENGE 
Studies such as that recently done by the M.I.T. Development Foundation, 
have shown that, on a relative basis, new and expanding small firms generate 
more jobs and income tax revenues than larger, more mature companies. 
Our challenge, then-yours and mine together-is to find the keys which will 
help to remove these impediments for t he millions of new and growing small 
businesses in America so they, in turn, can continue to infuse innovation and 
create new jobs and generate new revenues. 
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Task Force has made a series of some nineteen (19) recommendations 
dealing with SBA programs, taxes, securities laws and regulations and institu-
tional investments. A number of these are quite complex and technical, and I 
understand the Task Force also considered a host of other ideas during the 
course of its deliberations. 
I will discuss first the recommendations relating to SBA, and then those deal-
ing with other matters. • 
SBIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
As I have indicated in my previous testimony, the Small Business Investment 
Company ( SBIC) program is one of the remaining primary sources of risk 
capital for small business. 
In my opinion we should substantially enlarge the SBIC program in order to 
attract the large volume of risk capital required by small business. This may 
entail fundamental changes in the SBIC program to attract an increased flow of 
funds into the program by large institutional investors and other private 
sources of capital. 
The Task Force has made several specific recommendations r egarding the 
SBIC program and I will address each separately. 
In order to help overcome the heavy burden of debt service an SBIC must 
carry when leveraged through government borrowing at a 3: 1 or 4: 1 ratio, 
the Task Force has recommended that the portion of goven1ment debt which is 
used for equity investments be provided to the SBIO on a subsidized basis. 
Although the Task Force did not specify a rate of subsidization, I am opposed 
to tlle subsidized approach as a matter of principle, and because of the negative 
budget impact involved. The Congress has ·provided a limited form of subsidy 
to 30l(d) SBICs (commonly referred to as MESBICs), and I agree with this 
approach in light of the special nature of the businesses they deal with, namely 
firms owned by socially and economically disadvantaged persons. However, in 
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my judgment a subsidy for regular SBIC's would partially destroy the principle 
strength of the program-that of private investment companies making private 
investment decisions in the competitive marketplace. Subsidized borrowings 
would be tantamount to excessive government intervention in this process and 
•
uld help to destroy the concept. 
As an alternative, the SBA is now workiug on an approach to a revision of 
e structure of SBIC borrowings which, we believe, will achieve very much the 
same result without the need for a subsidy. 
The Task Force has also recommended a substantial increase in the size stand-
ards for companies in which SBICs can invest, and an indexing of those size 
standards to allow for future size adjustments according to market factors. 
As I understand the recommended size st'Undard increase, it is based on the 
contention that: 
Financial markets and economic conditions have changed dramatically over 
the last several years to the extent that many medium size companies are trapped 
between being too ·big to be financed by SBICs, yet too small to obtain funds in 
the public markets, and 
Increasing the size standards would allow SBICs a greater opportunity to 
make more highly liquid "venture capital", income producing investments which 
would, in turn, allow them grea•ter latitude to make lesser-yielding investments 
in small companies. 
The size criteria for the SBIC program were modified in 1975 when the asset 
test was increased from $5.5 million to $9 million, the net worth set from $2.5 
million to $4 million and the after tax earnings standard from $250 thousand to 
$400 thousand. The employment standards for manufacturing companies have 
remained substantially the same since the SBIC program was created in 1958. 
I am generally in sympathy with the Task Force's recommendation on the size 
standard increases, and I have initiated a study of the economic factors involved 
to determine to what ex•tent these standards can be legitimately raised. As to the 
indexing portion of the recommendations, this too seems like a sound idea and 
I have instructed my staff to study the indexing approach and give me recom-
mendations in the very near future. 
The Task Force also recommended that SBICs be permitted a deduction from 
ordinary income for loss reserves on the equity portion of their portfolios. 'Since 
this is essentially a tax matter, I will discuss it later in conjunction with other 
tax proposals. 
SBA GUARANTEED LOANS 
While recognizing the inherent value of SB.A's guaranty loan program, the 
'l'ask Force recommended that SBA should require commercial banks to- assume 
a larger portion of the risk-by providing a guaranty percentage of less than 
90 percent-and that SBA should change its one-time 1 percent guarantee fee to 
nnual fee reflecting the value and cost of SBA's guaranty. 
hile I have not made a complete analysis of what impact these changes 
ould have on the program, my initial conclusion is that the reduced guaranty 
percentage would be a disincentive to bank participation and could result in a 
reduction of ·the volume of loans to small business borrowers. As I have previ-
ously testified, we ha>e under study the alternative approach of an insured loan 
program. 
SBA'S SECONDARY l\IARKE'l' PROGRAM 
The Task Force r ecommended that we substantially expand our Secondary 
Market Program by creation of a "certificate" system for the sale of SBA-
guaranteed loans. 
As you know, we have made substantial progress in developing our secondary 
marketing system over the past two years, and guaranteed loans are now being 
sold by participating banks at an annual rate of some $300 million. 
Progress to .date has been achieved primarily by streamlining a still too cumber-
some sales procedure. 'l'he next logical step is a more simplified certificate system 
which will allow for the sale of a guaranteed portion of a loan just as though it 
were a freely transferable market security. We have a few remaining obstacles to 
overcome, but soon should have a certificate system in place which has the poten-
tial of substantially enla rging our ·secondary market sales. The great value of the 
system, of course, is that it provides liquidity to the banks during times of tight 
money, and the proceeds may be reinvested in small business. 
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In order to make these securities more attractive to investors, we now ham 
under consideration the modification of the nature of our guaranty so that it 
would be a guaranty of "timely payment of principal and interest" rather than 
the current guaranty of repayment in case of default. 
TAX, SEC AND ERISA RECOMMENDATIONS • When considered as a group, the Task Force recommendations relat ing to tax policy changes, modifications of SEC laws and regulations and changes ln the 
Employees Retirement Investment Securities Act, (ERISA), are designed to do 
two things: 
1. To increase the opportunity for small business to generate capital through 
retained earnings, and 
2. To provide a substantial set of incentives to the investment community to in-
vest an increased share of their capital in small business ventures. 
Certainly these are laudable objectives which I strongly endorse in principle. 
However, since these proposals clearly involve policy issues affecting several agen-
cies. Treasury, Labor ad S.E.C., and have potential revenue and budget impact, 
they will require further study by the new Administration. 
I intend to pursue these recommendations with the "White House, the Office 
of Management and Budget, Treasury, Labor and the S.E.C. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, let me repeat that I believe that the availability of " risk capital" 
is the most pressing financial problem facing small business today. We need to 
remove those impediments which stifle the growth of small business and work 
toward a rational system of financing that will give small business equal access 
to the market sources of capital. 
In my judgment, continued flows of capital investment into small business is 
crucial to the creation of jobs and the vitality of our economy. 
I look forward to working with you on finding solutions to the "Risk Capital" 
problem for small business. 
Mr. WEAVER. I welcome the opportunity to appear as the first wit-
ness before this newly established Subcommittee on Capital, Invest-
ment and Business Opportunitie. 
You are to be commended for the establishment of this new sub-
committee which will focus on the issue of investment capital for 
small business. 
As I have already indicated on several occasions in my previous 
testimony, in my view the most important financial problem sm. 
business faces today is the lack of access to venture and equity capih 
The venture and equity task force did an excellent job in analyzing 
this problem and presenting it in clear and precise terms. 
Their report was completed in J ·anuary of this year, and trans-
mitted by my predecessor to each member of the Small Business Com-
mittees of the House and Senate, other committees of the Congress 
having an interest in the subject, and to key officials in the executive 
branch. 
In summary, the task force has told us that in today's financial 
marketplace a series of serious impediments preclude small business 
from competitive access to needed capital. 
Public offerings by small companies have all but dried up in recent 
years, and this has been further compounded by the skyrocketing 
costs of entering the public markets. 
At the same time, the trend toward concentration of funds in larger 
institutional investors is clear. Because these institutions either follow 
relatively conservative investment policies, or are restricted by gov-
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ernmentally imposed investment standards, the net result is a further 
restriction on access to these funds by small business ventures. 
I won't go further in elaborating on the clear picture painted by 
•
he task force. The net reality, however, is that small business is 
slowly bein& foreclosed from access to "risk capital" which is desper-
ately needect for starting and expanding those small companies. 
The task force has made a series of some 19 recommendations deal-
ing with SBA programs, taxes, securities laws and regulations, and 
institutional investments. A number of these are quite complex and 
technical, and I understand the task force also considered a host of 
other ideas during the course of its deliberations. 
I will discuss first the recommendations relating to SBA, and then 
those dealing with other matters. 
In my opinion we should substantially enlarge the SBIC program 
in order to attract the large volume of risk capital required by small 
business. This may entail fundamental changes in th.e SBIC prograr:i 
to attract an increased flow of funds into the program by large insti-
tutional investors and other private sources of capital. 
The task force has also recommended a substantial increase in the 
size standards for companies in which SBIC's can invest, and an in-
dexin~ of those size standards to allow for future size adjustments 
according to market factors. 
I am generally in sympathy with the task force's recommendation on 
the size standard increases, and I have initiated a study of the eco-
nomic factors involved to determine to what extent these standards 
can be legitimately raised. As to the indexing portion of the recom-
mendations, this too seems like a sound idea, and I have instructed my 
staff to study the indexing approach and give me recommendations in 
the very near future. 
The task force also recommended that SBIC's be permitted a deduc-
tion from ordinary income for loss reserves on the equity portion of 
their portfolios. Smee this is essentially a tax matter, I will discuss it 
later in conjunction with other tax proposals . 
• 
The task force recommended that we substantially expand our sec-
ndary market program by creation of a "certificate" system for the 
sale of SBA-guaranteed loans. 
As you know, we have made substantial progress in developing our 
secondary marketing system over the past 2 years, and guaranteed 
loans are now being sold by participating banks at an annual rate of 
some $300 million. 
\Vb.en considered as a group, the task force recommendations relat-
ing to tax policy changes, modifications of SEC laws, and regulations 
and changes in the Employees Retirement Investment Securities Act 
(ERISA) are designed to do two things : 
1. To increase the opportunity for small business to generate capi-
tal through retained earnings; and 
2. To provide a substantial set of incentives to the investment com-
munity to invest an increased share of their capital in small business 
ventures. 
Certainly these are laudable objectives which I strongly endorse in 
principle. However, since these proposals clearly involve policy issues 
affecting several agencies, Treasury, L abor , and SEC, and ha Ye poten-
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tial revenue and budget impact, they will require further study by the 
new administration. · 
I intend to pursue these recommendations with the White House, 
the Office of Management and Budget, Treasury, Labor and the SEC. 
In conclusion, let me repeat that I believe that the availability o 
"risk capital" is the most pressing financial problem facing small busi-
ness today. We need to remove those impediments which stifle the 
growth of small business and work toward a rational system of financ-
ing that will give small business equal access to the market sources of 
capital. 
In my judgment, continued flows of capital investment into small 
business are crucial to the creation of jobs and the vitality of our 
economy. 
I look forward to working with you on finding solutions to the 
"risk capital" problem for small business. 
I will be glad to answer any questions you may have. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Weaver. 
You have indicated that we could substantially enlarge the SBIC 
program. 
Mr. ·WEAVER. Of course. 
Mr. LAFALCE. This may entail some fundamental changes in the 
program. Could you give me an idea of what those fundamental 
changes could be. Are they among the recommendations of the task 
force or do you have some other ideas? 
Mr. WEAVER. Both. Mr. Chairman, one of the things I hope to do, 
and this would not necessitate a change, is to greatly broaden the 
sources of capital of the SBIC program. The place that I look to first 
is the insurance industry from which I came. There is relatively no 
insurance interest in the SBIC program. I think six or seven insur-
ance companies out of the several thousand are involved. I hope that 
I can involve particularly the large mutual companies who have large 
cash flows. 
There are impediments that are technical and I am going to address 
them. There are rules that need to be changed. • 
Mr. LAFALCE. Would any of those impediments be under the juri 
diction of the Small Business Committee? 
Mr. "'WEAVER. I don't think so since the insurance industry is regu-
lated by the States. It is State insurance commissioners and their 
associates that I need to talk to. Mr. McN eish may have something 
to add. 
Mr. McNErsH. I think the answer at the moment, Congressman, is 
we are taking a look with our advisory council in the SBIC program, 
taking a look at the nature of the program and its current structure 
to see if we could alleviate some of the problems, particularly the 
debt service problem that the SBIC has in terms of their current 
borrowing from the SBA. 
Our analysis reveals that the leverage of 3 : 1 and 4 : 1 levies a sub-
stantial burden on the SBIC and the impacts on the SBIC in terms 
of its ability to reinvest their funds in equity. So, we are taking a 
look at that in terms of the structural problems involved. I think 
down the road further, analysis may reveal some other possible changes 
that might be necessary. 
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In short, most of those issues are under study and will receive some 
additional analysis. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. One of the recommendations of the task force is that 
•
ome portion of borrowed funds used for equity investments take 
he form of debt with the interest partially subsidized. 
Do you favor guaranteeing that debt? Do you favor subsidizing the 
interest? 
Mr. WEAVER. Subsidizing the interest concerns me, Mr. Chairman. 
I am very much in sympathy with the fact that when we are loan-
ing money to an SBIC and r equire them to pay interest to us and they 
in turn are using that money to furnish equity capital to a small 
business and may have no return for many, many years, it creates 
a problem for SBIC. w·hat the answer is to it I have not really 
formulated and the studies will give me a better position. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Has the SBA made any analysis of the burden of the 
debt service because of increased leverage that is available. 
Mr. McNEISH. ·we have the beginnings of a computer analysis 
underway now. I don't want to give you any conclusive answers at 
the moment but the preliminary conclusions are that when an SBIC 
reaches the third dollar leverage point, and if the SBIC is in turn 
attempting to put those funds in equity type investments, then it is 
extremely difficult in the short term to meet those debt services, liter-
ally impossible in some cases. 
I suspect we will have that analysis completed within the next 3 
or 4 months and it will give us the kind of indications of where we 
are going with the debt structure for SBIC's. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Well, if we don't have a partial subsidy then there is 
that problem. What are the alternatives ? 
Mr. ·WEAVER. What is needed in my opinion is for SBA to use an 
advocacy approach to persuade them it may be in their best interest 
and the interest of the country to infuse the SBIC with equity money 
themselves. I think that is the answer, to find a source of equity for 
them so that they can provide equity for small businesses. 
- Mr. L AF ALCE. Mr. vVeaver, a rather broad question: I consider 
~BIC's important, but yet in the total scheme of things what per-
centage of equity or capital is provided by them? It is my under-
standing that it is a small percentage, maybe 1 percent of the total. 
I s that not true? 
Mr. ' VEA VER. I am not sure that is true today. 
Mr. McNErSH. I think you may be referring to some statistical anal-
ysis that was done and I have seen that same statistic. I think that 
those 1 percent or 2 percent figures relate to total investment capital-
both loans and debt included-in small businesses. Again, _we have 
the same data problem. It is difficult to aggregate factual and coi1clu-
sive figures on total capital being invested in business today. I would 
surmise that the SBIC's percent of that together with private ven-
ture capital is substantially larger than 1 or 2 percent. You get into 
the questions, I think, of the definition as to what constitutes venture 
capital and in what part of that universe are SBIC's investing. But 
it is far greater than the 1-percent figure reflected in, I think, the pre-
vious testimony you are referring to. 
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· Mr. ·WEAVER. If I can add to that. The administration's position is 
that the equity capital to small business should come from the private 
sector, overpoweringly so. I don't have that statistic to prove what I 
am going to say but I think now with the private sector's inability t . 
refuse to provide that equity to small capital that the SBIC's are pro 
vided a greater portion than the administration would care to see 
them provided. It is a question of-it has actually happened. 
Mr. LAFALCE. The thrust behind my question was that while we 
have a specific responsibility on this committee and you have a specific 
responsibility as Administrator to make sure that we develop the 
SBIC concept to its full potentia1l, and we will do that, by the same 
token we also have an advocacy role insofar as other laws are con-
cerned and other committees and other departments or agencies. We 
have to give certain priorities of time. Shall we be spending more of 
our time and effort in continuing the snrtax exemption, for example, 
rather than this change in the SBIC ~ We try to keep these things in 
perspective. That is why I am extremely interested in the advocacy 
role that your Agency will play with the other departments regarding 
some of these recommendations. That is why I was interested that you 
intend to pursue this in the 'Vhile House, Treasury, Labor, and SEC, 
because I think perhaps the greatest role of the SBIC and the greatest 
role of the Small Business Administration is an advocacy role as far 
as the changes in the tax laws are concerned, in ERISA laws, security 
laws and regulations, et cetera. They are not going to call us and tell 
us what the problems of small businesses are. ' iVe are going to have to 
actively go out. To my knowledge this task force report has drawn 
little or no attention prior to this time. I saw a mention of it once in 
a Forbes magazine article. I don't know if anybody else saw it. 
I do know that at meetings of other committees on which I serve I 
made reference to the report to previous secretaries and to Chairman 
Shultze and they were not aware of it. I sent Mr. Shultze a copy, et 
cetera. I think that is a very, very important part of all our jobs . 
.Now that I have used up more than 5 minutes of my time I will turn 
over to Bob Kasten. • 
Mr. KASTEN. Well , the chairman can keep the time. 
Mr. Weaver, about the problem that private capital has all been 
drawn up in recent years and the chairman mentioned in his statement 
that the number of stock offerings has frullen drastically from 1969 to 
to 1975. I am sme that is the case but if you look at what has happened 
in the market isn't it true that the number of stock net worth would 
have dropped quite drastically. W"e have gone through the change in 
small business. Is it the other way or is it small companies that have 
lost the most or is it just that~ 
Mr. WEAVER. Yes. First, in 1970 and 1974 all companies had, but 
over the span of time, I wou1ld say the last 2 years, 'large companies 
have had no trouble raising capital and of course, they have other 
places to go to in the market and small business has consistently been 
the one to suffer. 
Mr. KASTEN. So, it is a fact that the small businesses with a net 
worth of less than $5 million, have been in a dec;line; that their trend 
has gone against the market, if you will. 
Mr. WEAVER. Yes. 
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Mr. KASTEN. There has been much said about elimination of double 
taxation of capital dividends and that the removal of this double taxa-
tion would stimu'1ate capital formation. What is your position and the 
•
sition of the admini?tration on the eliminatio!1-I under~t~nd this 
i't only a small busmess problem, but what is your pos1t1on per-
sonally and then what is the position of the administration on the 
exemption or the double taxation of dividends? 
Mr. WEAVER. The administration's position is that it would be better 
to do away with it. It would not help small business. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. \Vl1ich administration, the Small Business Admin-
istration or the Carter administration? 
Mr. WEAVER. No; the Carter administration, but in my opinion this 
eliminating of this double tax would not help small businesses. 
Mr. KASTEN. Would it hurt small business or would it have no 
effect? 
Mr. ·WEAVER. I think no effect. It has some effect but most small busi-
nesses are using capital to reinvest in their business. 
Mr. K ASTEN. ·wouldn't it be best if the taxation was on the individual 
receiving the dividend or the tax remaining on the corporation? \Vliich 
side do you think ought to be taxed? 
Mr. \VEAVER. I really don't think it makes much difference b~cause 
they reinvest the money. 
Mr. K ASTEN. Another question that has been in some of the legisla-
tion that has been proposed is that of a graduated corporate income 
tax. I s the position of you and the Carter administration in favor of a 
graduated corporate income tax? 
Mr. \VEAVER. I can't speak for the Carter administration because we 
have not discussed it, but it is something we want to recommend. 
Mr. KASTEN. I do not think anybody questions the need for equity, 
but the reason we focus on that, when we are talking about small busi-
ness and equity instead of a combination of equity and debt capital is 
that most small businesses have debt capital as well as equity capital. 
How has the traditional emphasis on debt capital for small businesses 
•
orked against or not served small :business communities? 
Mr. WEAVER. \Vell, debt capital in the small business community is 
rved by our 7 (a) program which is a large lending program that has 
experienced the highest 2 months in its history, the last 2 months. It is 
just growing by leaps and bounds. I think we are doing a reasonably 
good iob of supplying debt to smaJl business where needed. That is 
why I said that the lapse has gone. You need both, and all we have is 
a chance to off er debt. 
Mr. K ASTEN. The task force report has recommended on page 11 that 
commercial banks be required to assume a greater share of the risks in 
long-term financing. Are you aware of the problem in trying to do this 
nnder the SBA accelerated bank trial program? You have gone into 
this and it is my understanding that it has not worked. Could you. 
No. 1, tell us what your experience has been and No. 2, why it has not 
worked and what makes you think it will work? 
Mr. WEAVER. I don't think we can tell the commercial bank system 
oHhe United States what risks they should assume. 
Mr. McNEISH. The accelerated bank program does not address the 
problem of a large portion of the risk. That particular program is not 
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desig11ed to address that issue. vVhat it was designed to try to do is 
speed up the processing of the loans. Essentially, we said to the 
banks if we set some preconditioned criteria and if the borrower 
meets those criteria he automatically can qualify for a guarant. 
·whether the pro~ram has worked or not is now under study. It was . 
pilot program. Tne volumes are relatively low and this might be for 
several reasons. Our criteria might be much too tight. We are study-
ing that now. There will be a decision of either continuation or dissolu-
tion very shortly. 
Mr. KASTEN. Maybe I am wrong. It was my understanding that you 
started trying to put a program in effect and essentially backed off 
to a pilot program because it didn't work when you put it into effect. 
Is my information incorrect? 
Mr. vVEAVER. That is incorrect. ·we started with a pilot program 
originally and maintain it on a pilot program basis. ·we have closed it 
down now to review the results of it to consider whether it should be 
expanded, curtailed, or ended. 
Mr. KASTEN. Even before you got into this pilot program hasn 't 
the SBA been trying to encourage or-I don't want to use the word 
force, but I think encourage banks to take a greater amount of inter-
est in small business. Hasn't the SBIC been working before the pro-
gram started ? 
Mr. vV EA VER. There is a continuing emphasis. 
Mr. KASTEN. To insure a greater and greater risk ? 
Mr. McNEisH. The accelerated bank program was designed only to 
address the issue of loan processing time. Our national figures show 
that it takes up to 22 days from the time a loan hits the SBA to the 
time we approve it. That is the major issue that that program is ad-
dressing itself to. The question of increased risk by the banks, that is 
a continuing effort. 
Mr. w ·EAVER. You may be thinking of my predecessor's insured ap-
proach which changed from a guarantee to insurance, and the banks 
would have as little as 50 up to 60, 80, and 90. That has not yet been 
tried. ~ 
Mr. KASTEN. Thank you. 
Mr. MARIUOTT. I apologize for coming in late, but this is a subjec 
very dear to my heart, having been a business consultant for a number 
of years, tax matters, and equity capital matters, and coming from 
an area where 64: percent of all of the jobs are provided by small 
business. So, I welcome this opportunity. 
I want to ask a couple of questions. ':Dhe people who are working in 
your department today, what are their backgrounds? Do they come 
from the private sector, or do they come up from HUD and HEW? 
Do they think in terms of small business or are they far removed ? I 
ask that as a personal question. 
Mr. \iVEAVER. As far as I am concerned, I come from the small busi-
ness community and never worked for Government. So, I think I am 
more generally toward small business. The persons I have coming 
aboard as associates, for the most part, I can say the same thing. 
Mr. MARRIOTT. I just quickly read your testimony, and I think I 
agree that just throwing money at small business is not the answer 
and stock offering certainly is not going to help most of them. And 
-. 
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the double elimination or double taxation on di \'idcnds is not the 
answer either. 
·what I am concerned about is what the role of the SBA ought to 
be. vVe just spent many billions of dollars for public works jobs. I am 
wondering if you have any gut feeling as to whether a program could 
be arranged where you could do away with that type of thing and 
channel that money into small businesses requiring them to hire some 
people and then using a management team to help. I t seems to me most 
problems are management as well as capital. 
Has that idea ever come across? 
Mr. WEAVER. Very definitely. I have testified before that I am 
frustrated by the lack of a data base. I don't know, and I am going 
to find out how many dollars we spend to create a job. I hope to be 
able to testify to that one of these clays. 
I have a gut feeling that the SBA program might be the cheapest 
program in the Government in the area of job creation, and we are 
talking about that. 
Also, I agree thoroughly, and the President is most adamant on 
this, that management assistance is the problem in many cases. H e has 
directed me to greatly expand our management assistance program. 
He has made the statement that to his knowledge that in most cases 
our management assistance program comes into play when the com-
pany is already broke. He wants that stopped. 
Mr. MARRIOTT. I have also assisted many people in filling out the 
applications for an SBA loan. That has got to be somewhat of a joke 
in many cases. I am wondering what your feelings are of putting the 
SBA in the risk capital business rather than the guarantee business? 
Mr. vVEAVER. That gives me a problem, sir. I don't think that the 
SBA should be in the business of risking capital. 
Mr. MARRIOTT. Or at least modifying so we do not try to have a 
foolproof business where we invest the money. Do you see any problem 
with reducing the standards to qualify for a loan and being a little 
bit more lenient? 
Mr. "'VEAVER. That, of course, would require new laws. vVe are re-
quired to make the loans to assure ourselves that the loans will be 
repaid. That is by statute. 
Mr. MARRIOTT. "'Ve can make the laws here but the question is, does 
the concept turn you on or does it create more problems? 
Mr. "'VEAVER. vVell, I have mixed feelings. I have discussed this with 
the President specifically. To loan money to a business that is not able 
to repay the loan may be a disservice to that business. I am not saying 
we should not perhaps relax our standards somewhat, but to loan 
money to situations that are just not going to be able to pay is a 
disservice. 
I think that those companies, in our advocacy role, we should try 
to get more equity capital available. 
Mr. MARRIOTT. You mentioned in your testimony something about 
ERISA, which is another subject dear to my heart, as bad as it might 
be. In your experience-going beyond the business that is struggling, 
tJo the small business that is doing quite well, do you have any infor-
mation that ESOP's are in fact helping the business or are they caus-
ing them future trouble? 
98- 184- 77--2 
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. Mr. :WEAVER. I certainly don't have any fio·ures on l!.;:::;OP. It is an 
idea with merit. We are investigating it and ~re pretty close to sayino· 
that we ca~ make SBA loans to assist employees in the ESOP proi 
ess by makmg the company part of the loan. What the impact is I 
can't say . 
. Mr. LUKEN. I also apologize for being late. Therefore, I won't go 
mto what may be duplicative, but with regard to the last comment 
about ERISA, do you find that ERISA is burdensome, on the invest-
ment aspect, which is mentioned in the task ,force report? Do you 
find ERISA unduly burdensome? 
Mr. LAFALCE. Y'Our vote is right there. They are unanimous. 
Mr. LUKEN. It was a very politic question to ask. 
Mr. WEA VER. It is certainly important. 
Mr. LUKEN. But is it important? . 
Mr. WEAVER. Yes; I do think the pension plan should be lightened. 
I think the worst thing that bothers small businesses is that imposing 
of the prudent man rule on management. They are terrified that they 
are going to be sued by their employees. They are afraid they will be 
dropped by their insurance carriers. That, for example, might be 2 
cents a thousand d'Ollars more. I think those burdens should be 
r emoved. 
Mr. LUKEN. That is on the investment aspect, but what about the 
administration aspect? 
Mr. WEAVER. I have seen the forms. I have not personally filled one 
out. But I don't know that that can be changed very much. It is a bur-
den but, nevertheless, the law is there. You have to comply with it. 
I don't think that form can be shortened to any great extent. 
Mr. LUKEN. What are the reports that you are doing as to how 
ERISA is operating? Have they geared up ? I am new hece. My ex-
perience in the private field-very limited experience-was that 
ERISA, during the last year, wasn't very responsive. 
Mr. vVEAVER. My experience before I came to the Government was 
that ERISA certainly recruits small business people, not only because 
of the "prudent man rule" which restricts the investments a trustee can 
make, but by the extension of ERISA to group life and health 
insurance. 
Mr. LUKEN. I am asking about ERISA- the company. 
Mr. WEAVER. The Government? 
Mr. LuKEN. Beneficial Guaranty Corp. Is that the name of it i 
Mr. WEAVER. I really cann'Ot say. 
Mr. LuKEN. W e cannot get an answer out of them. 
Mr. MARRIOT!'. Having a lot of experience in this, ERISA stands for 
"everything rotten since Adam." [Laughter.] . 
Mr. LAF ALCE. I think Secretary Blumenthal recently said some-
thing similar to that. . . · . . . . . 
Mr. MARRIOT!'. I think it is the respons1bihty of this committee, but I 
suppose that it is also taken up in the Ways and Means. Small busi-
nesses are really in trouble under the ERISA. It is a bad scene. 
I hope that t~is committee wit~ the help of the SB~ can. do some-
thing. to solve it . I don't know if Ways natl Means is gomg to do 
anythrng. 
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I filled out every form. I have administered over 100 plans. It is 
ridiculous. I would hope that maybe we can take the initiative to do 
something about it. . 
Mr. LUKEN. I was trying to get some idea of about what kind of 
initiative. I will yield further if the gentleman has any ideas. 
Mr. LAFALCE. vVe do have a good many witnesses we want to hear. 
But before we go on, I did want to make a few points as far as your 
presentation is concerned. 
First, we are, in general, in concurrence with your point on the.task 
force report. Therefore, I am especially interested in working with 
the SBA and the Office of Legislative Counsel in drafting tough legis-
lation that this subcommittee would be introducing. 
So, if you could go to the recommendations-I don't think that I am 
asking you to ignore interest subsidy. I have considerable reservations 
as to that. I would like to work with you in drafting legislation: First, 
permitting SBA to allow reserves in equity loans to small businesses; 
second, implementing the recommendation for a substantial increase 
in the size standards for SBIC's investment; and third, possibly even 
the annual revision of the standards, which you are now studying. 
I would like to move rather quickly. I am not particularly enchanted 
to have an annual fee nor do I think you are. 
I am very interested in your secondary market program and certifi-
cate system, and I have already asked Mr. McNeish for a detailed 
explanation of the steps the SBA would need to take to implement 
that. I am very concerned, though, about whether we can implement 
that kind of program and have it do much good without tremendously 
expanding the overall authority of the SBA. 
I think you probably share that concern. If so, we are also going to 
have to do something about the authority. 
You are reviewing your accelerated program. I just want to tell 
you that my finding is based upon talking with people both in the 
banking field and SBA. That may be the best program under 7(a) 
that you have initiated. The banks that participated in the experi-
ment really like it. It is staff action. I doubt very much if the loss 
experience is any greater at all. It might do a lot of good to implement 
the 7 (a) program. 
I thi!1k it is extremely important that we develop the data that you 
are so mterested in because I am very interested in it, too. I was one 
of the !ew Democrats that voted against the public works bill. When 
you thmk of the amount of that money and the time it takes and the 
long-te~m effect, or lack .of it, in comparison with what we could have 
done with that amount if we used a different approach. I think if we 
coul~ .devel?P that data, working together we could convince the 
a~mmistration and Congress, perhaps, that we should be taking a 
different approach. 
While the task force report has r ecommended ch an o-es in ERISA 
the prudent man rule, and so forth, comments have bee~ made that w~ 
have an inv~stment problem but that only affects a small percentage ~:rf small bus~ness types. Most small businesses are affected by ERISA 
m a much ~1~erent ~a}'.'. '.J'hey have 10 employees. They have-how-
ever many it is, 30 md1viduals. set up a pension plan and then the 
small busmessman decides, "OK, I will just not have a pension plan 
• , 
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anymore." The task force report was not charged with the respon-
sibility of investigating that. So we do not fault it for that. But that 
certainly should be the responsibility of the SBA. 
Before we continue on with any other witnesses, are there any other 
comments ? [No response.] 
Thank you very much. 
The remaining witnesses are all members of the task force, and I 
t hink it would be best if, berause of the constraints of time, we take 
your testimony as a panel. IV e are in session today at 11 o'clock, and 
although we will not conclude by 11 o'clock, we will be subject to the 
call of the bells. 
Mr. Casey, you can have a seat here. Mr. Golder, Mr. Hambrecht, 
Mr. Lea, and Mr. Pearsall. 
I want to thank you for coming here, for preparing your statements, 
and I want to thank you for the time you gave in the past 10 months 
or so in :contributing to this task force report. To the extent that it is 
any consolation to you , I want yon to know that i t is my intention 
that this task force r eport not simply be filed and collect dust but that 
it be used as a good starting point from which to make legislative and 
other changes. 
Mr. Pearsall, I do know Mr. Wirth wanted to be here. H e probably 
had 10 other engagements. 
I think, Mr. Casey, as chairman of this task force, that it would be 
most appropriate to have you begin your testimony first. 
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM J. CASEY, CHAIRMAN, SBA TASK FORCE 
ON VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL AND COUNSEL, ROGERS & 
WELLS, WASHINGTON, D.C.; ACCOMPANIED BY STANLEY GOLDER, 
PRESIDENT, FIRST CAPITAL CORP. OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO, ILL.; 
WILLIAM R. HAMBRECHT, PARTNER, HAMBRECHT & QUIST, SAN 
FRANCISCO, CALIF. ; CHARLES L. LEA, JR., EXECUTIVE VICE 
PRESIDENT, NEW COURT SECURITIES CORP., NEW YORK, N.Y.; 
AND DUANE D. PEARSALL, PRESIDENT, STATITROL CORP., LAKE-
WOOD, COLO. 
Mr. CASEY. Thank :you , Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear 
here. It is particularl:y encouraging to have this new subcommittee 
describe itself as working on capital , investment and business oppor-
tunity. I think we are particubrl:y encouraged b:y :your attitude toward 
our report and :your statement and dinlog with Mr. liVeaver about the 
idea of the SBA and this committee functioning in an advocacy role, 
The reason I sa:y that is that SBA 'plays a ver:y important role, but the 
funds it makes available to small businesses really are a trickle as 
compared to the huge public savings that are being inhibited from 
investing in new and expanding small businesses. 
I have submitted a statement as you requested and I would merely 
like to, as you also requested, focus on what I consider to be our more 
sip1ificant recommendations. 
[The prepared statement follows :] 
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PREPARED STATE~CENT OF ' V I LLIAM J. CASEY, CHAIRMAN, SBA TASK FORCE ON 
VENTURE AN D l DQUITY C APITAL AND COUNSl':L, Rocrns & ".E LS, ".ASILL\'G-
TON, D.C. 
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee vn CapitaJ, Investment and 
Business Opportunities of the Committee on Small Business of the Hotg;e of 
Representatives. -
I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you the Report of the 
SBA Task Force on Venture 'and Equity Capital for Small Business. This 'l'ask 
Force was :appointed in July of 1976 by Mitchell Kobelinski, then the SBA 
Administ1'1ltor. Its membership Tepresented ra wide cross section of experience in 
the operation of small businesses, commercial banking, venture capital, the 
vperation of Small Business Investment companies, investment banking, insti-
tutional investing, specialized financing and business research and education. It 
wras able to enlist the advice and experience of officials from the SBA, the SEC, 
the Treasury, the Labor Department, the Internal Revenue Service and private 
financial institutions. 
'Ve concluded that, unless we keep risk capital flowing into new enterprises, 
our economic ·Progress and competitiveness in world markets will erode and 
young people will be denied vpportunity. It is alarming that, in America today, 
Yenture ca1pital for new and small businesses has become almost invisible. In 
1972, there were 418 fi rm underwri tings for corpj)rations with a net worth under 
$5 million; in 1975, there were only four. 'l'hese 1972 offerings uaised $918 mil-
lion; the 1975 undertakings brought in $16 million. Over that same period vf 
time, Regulation A offerings fell from $256 millio1 lid $49 million. While this 
catmstrophic decline in the capital small companies raised in our public markets 
was occurring, the new monpy generated for a ll corporations in registered under-
takings increased nearly fifty .percent-from $28 billion to over $41 billion 
annually. 
At the same time, professional venture capitalis ts have been increasingly stay-
ing away from start-ups and young businesses. using their funds instead to take 
posi tions in established companies. A survey of investments made by members of 
the National Venture Capital Association, an organization vf professional ven-
ture capital investors, revealed that in 1975, only four percent of their invest-
ments were start-ups, and only two percent were first-round financings-a sharp 
decline from previous years. More and more of these firms seem to have estab-
lished a policy of avoiding start-ups by requiring an earµin gs record for at least 
one year before committing their funds. Apparently, experience has taught these 
firms a clear lesson. They must be able to recycle their money to get a satis-
factory return on their capital; the time lag and the serious difficulties in getting 
their money out of new businesses has pushed their funds toward more mature 
companies. We believe tha t this stag-nation in small business financing arises 
from a set of general conditions which have developed in the American economy 
and from specific impediments which can be discerned in our tax structure, in 
the restrictions on the investment of pension ftmds which have been imposed by 
the ERISA statute, and in SEO regulations governing the issuance and resale of 
securi ties. 
The general characteristics can be summarized this way: 
1. A public policy that tilts sharply :towards encouraging consumption and 
discouraging savings and investment. 
2. An increasing and dangerously high ratio of debt tv equity arising in 
part from artificial tax advantages extended to debt financing. 
3. Distinct impediments :to raising equity and other forms of risk capital. 
4. Savings gravitating towards larger institutions that are discouraged 
from investing those savings in smaller and new businesses. 
5. Well-intentioned efforts to protect investors which inadvertently place 
small businesses at a disadvantage in competing for available funds. 
6. Attrition and concentration in the network of financial institutions and 
firms t hat has served our economic needs well b:v mobilizing capital. 
In addressing the financial needs of small businesses and the impediments to 
meeting them, it soon becomes apparent that the problem is different for: 
a. the many small businesses 1that are local in character or so family 
owned and managed that they would be unlikely to have or want access to 
the public securities markets; and 
b. those businesses that can develop so that they will need access to public 
financing. 
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There are different remedies called for with respect to these two broad cate-
gories of smaller businesses. 
There is a cycle of financial events and opportunities into which new and 
growing businesses have to fit themselves to finance their growth and expansion. 
This cycle starts off with the ability to save and the will to commit those sav-
ings in order to start a small business. Here, if public policy is to reflect the 
contribution new and small business can make to the national welfare, our tax 
system has to encourage necessary savings and the commitment of these savings 
to new and small businesses. 
'l.'hen, after a new business is launched, the tax system should permit it to 
generate sufficient internal capital so that a growing equity and credit base will 
enable it to meet growth requirements. This can be done with some deferral of tax 
payments; allowing small businesses greater flexibility in charging off the asset· 
needed to do its business; and an increase to reflect inflation in the amounts to 
which small business tax treatment now applies. This will pr·ovide greater reve-
nues for the Government in the future as small businesses use this increase in 
internal financing to provide additional jobs and greater taxable wages and 
profits. 
The most direct and effective step that can help small business is to bring the 
$50,000 of corporation earnings now taxed at a 'lower rate in line with inflation 
and the escalation of risks and higher costs in starting and carrying on business. 
Consequently, the Task Force recommended the corporate tax rates be modified 
so that the first $100,000 of corporate taxable income should be taxed at lower 
rates. 
Allowing small businesses greater flexibility in writing off the first $200,000 
of depreciable assets is another step that should be taken to increase the internal 
financing that is so critical to businesses in their early years. 
The capital gains tax has become so high that it no longer serves as an incen-
Hve to provide long-term investment capital. Deferring that tax as long as these 
funds remain invested in small business can provide a major incentive to attract 
the individual investor back to investing in small companies. The Task Force 
recommended that investors in qualified small businesses should be permitted to 
defer the tax on capital gains if the proceeds of a profitable sale are r einvested 
in another qualified small business within a specified time period. There is ample 
precedent for 'this kind of deferral in home sales, condemnations and retirement 
plan distributions. Since small businesses are potentially the most rapidly grow-
ing part of the equity investment spectrum, the ultimate tax revenues can be 
significantly higher, more than offsetting the cost of deferring revenues. 
Institutionalization of the stock market has meant that the small businessman 
must appeal to a professional investor who has a large amount of mone:v and 
limited time to analyze potential investments. Increasingly, a major source of 
capital in America is the money in pension and other employee trusts. Fiduciary 
standards created by ERISA, however, have isolated about $200 billion of money 
in these trusts from all investments other than large blue chip, and fixed income 
securities. Attorneys advising trust officers have interpreted ERISA regulations 
conservatively, although they do not differ significantly from commonly practiced 
standards of fiduciary responsibility. As a result, trustees are reluctant to invef't 
in companies without strong earnings records. Mo9t pension trustees find it 
neither economic or prudent to invest in companies without a capitalization large 
enough to give investors liquidity. It appears that the market value of a firm 
must be over one hundred million dollars to interest pension funds managers. 
ERISA should be amended in two important respects : 
1. To expressly declare a policy of allowing pension funds to invest in a 
broad spectrum of American companies by clarifying ERISA's "prudent 
man" standard so that it is clearly applicable to the total portfolio of pension 
fund investments rather than individual investments. and 
2. To relieve pension fund managers of ERISA restrictions in investing np to 
five percent of pension fund assets in companies having less than $25 million 
in net worth and larger companies having limited marketability for their 
securities. 
T~ese modifications should be designed to encourage the development of pro-
fess1 onally managed pools of capital to assume responsibility for segments of the 
portfolio that pension fund managers do not have the time or experience to effec-
tively invest in new ventures and growing companies. The SEC should exempt 
t hese special funds from the time-consuming and cumbersome requirements of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. 
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Small businessmen whos·e enterprises survive and thdve may find it necessary 
to seek external financing by the sale of their securities to investors. There is 
a new set of obstacles on this road to economic growth. 
The access of small companies to public markelts, particularly in the early 
1950's, encouraged the formation of venture capital-money that was a'l'ailable 
for innovation and small business growth in the hope that some of the funds 
invested could be recovered within two to five years. 
Venture capitalists, however, like an investors, found that recent years were 
difficult ones. They were forced to cut back on investments in many new ventures, 
because without a lively secondary market for resale of these secudties, under-
writings do not take place. Without underwritings, there are no investments, and 
the economy suffers. 
Congress provided a private offedng exemption in enac!ting the Securities Act 
of 1933. Administrative and court interpretations have so narrowed the scope of 
this exemption that investors in very small financings have been able to change 
their minds and get their money back simply because the offering had not been 
registered. The buyer of stock who is defrauded has been provided with an effec-
tive remedy by the SEC through its development of Rule 10b(5). Requiring a 
small business to register a limited financing under pain of having to return the 
proceeds in the absence of any fraud was never intended and Congress should 
take legislative action to restore the private offering exemption. 
The SEC developed Rule 146 to provide a safe harbor for private offerings that 
claim the private offering exemption and do not register. The SEC is to be com-
mended for an imaginative effort to dear up the difficulties created by the attri-
tion of the statutory private offering exemption. However, this Rule will neces-
sarily be cU111bersome, complicated and burdensome until Congress acts to restore 
the original intent of the private offering exemption. 
The limitations that the SEC has developed on the secondary sale of securities 
are probably more damaging to small business financing in the public securities 
markets than the high cost of registration and the near disappearance of the 
private offering exemption. If the kind of risk money that goes into new and 
growing businesses cannot be readily recycled, it is usually not invested. It is the 
inability to readily convert some ·of the profits on successful investments back into 
cash that has driven professional venture capitalists away from start-ups to-
wards companies with proven earning records. Furthermore, this leads to the 
liquidation of investments through takeovers by large corporations instead of by 
sales in the public securities markets. 
Where Rule 144 is harmful is in its effort to protect the market from selling 
pressure through quantitative limitations on the shares which may be sold in any 
six-month period. This quantitative limitation has a whole series of consequences 
that impede venture investing, are counterproductive to investor protection and 
promote concentration. The limitations on moving out of a risk investment cause 
venture capitalists to go in for smaller percentages and in lesser amounts. The 
restricted pace at which they are able to liquidate their investment contributes 
substantially to the trend to stay away from young companies and to restrict 
venture capital to companies which have matured or seem to be on the verge of 
maturing. When they do have a successful investment, the difficulty of recycling 
their investment through private sales gives an edge to the large company that 
can take over the smaller company in one bite. This, in turn, reduces competition 
and promotes concentration. 
The Commisison can and should speedily amend Rule 144 to provide that exist-
ing quantitative limitations apply for only a three-month period instead of six 
months, and that the limit be set at one percent of outstanding shares or the 
average weekly volume, whichever is higher, instead of whichever is lower. The 
Commission's economics staff has undertaken what is, as far as I know, the first 
empirical analysis of the need and justification for "protecting the market" b.\' 
the use of any quantitative restriction on secondary sales of unregistered securi-
ties. If this study concludes that required disclosure of the amount of shares to be 
offered-combined with the self interest of the sellers in not breaking the mar-
ket-is all the protection the market needs or deserves, the quant itative limita-
tion should be further reduced or eliminated after some reasonably set holding 
period. Protection of investors against uninformed or misinformed buying is an-
other matter which is substantially met by the requirement that the issuer shall 
have made information about its performance publicly and currently available to 
--------- -----
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the same extent as other issuers having shares-registered or unregistered-
traded in the public securities markets. 
Mr. CASEY. Then general conclusion of the task force was that to 
restore capital for small business and growth businesses, the tax im-
pediment is the primary obstacle. We have dissolved capital gains taxes 
to a point where the risks, which are inherent in these investments, are 
just increasingly less justified. 
l\Ir. KASTEN. Mr. Casey, the people in the back are having a difficult 
time hearing you. They are all straining back there. 
Mr. CASEY. I will speak up. 
The capital gains tax rate has been increased so as to lessen the tax 
on the differential between the tax on the gain from a risk investment 
and ordinary investment and earned income. This has become 
the most fundamental impediment to taking the real risks involved in 
a new venture. 
So, one of our most important decisions was to recommend allow-
ing reinvestment of the gain on small business investment, with the 
capital gains tax deferred. That would encourage risk investment and 
would reestablish. the incentive to take the risks required to provide 
equity and venture money for small businesses. That is our major tax 
recommendation for encouraging investment in small business. I have 
another important tax recommendation which I will come to later on 
when talking about small businesses that have to finance themselves. 
The other major impediment is in the SEC rules and regulations. 
The cost of registering is over $100,000 which is an automatic bar to 
many worthwhile businesses. Underwriting costs will more than dou-
ble that for most small business offerings. These impediments have 
grown. For about 20 or 25 years it was assumed that small businesses 
could get together, 20 or 30 investors, pool their money to start or 
finance a business without the requirement of registration. This 
exemption over the years has been narrowed so that offerings involv-
ing as few as two or three people have been held to require 
registration. 
·The SEC can and should speedily amend rule 144 to provide that 
existing quantitative limitations apply for only a 3-month period 
instead of 6 months, and that the limit be set at 1 percent of out-
standing shares or the average weekly volume, whichever is higher, 
instead of whichever is lower. 
The net effect of the existing r equirement is that the investors who 
are prevented from recycling their money are not likely to invest at 
all. The effects of these regulations has seriously clogged the chan-
nels of venture capital. This not only has made it difficu1t to start 
businesses and finance their growth, but it has created constraints on 
competition because unnecessary regulations on the resale of ~tock in 
these small businesses leads small companies to sell out to big com-
panies as the only way to expand and the only way to liquefy money 
investea in their original stock. . . 
Now this is a complicated problem. I can only touch on it. It is a problei~ that requires a great deal of attention in both the Congress 
and the SEC. . 
I bear some responsibility for some of tho?e regulations because I 
was Chairman of the SEC when they were maugurated. They were 
21 
put forth as experimental. They have worked well to some extent, 
and I am pleased to see the Commission is asking for their 
reconsideration. 
I was so stimulated by the task force's consideration of this prob-
lem that I did a law review article on these SEC restrictions. I have 
a couple of copies here which may be useful to the subcommittee. 
Now, the final point I would like to touch on is that as we analyze 
the problem it becomes clear that there are two distinct categories of 
small businesses. First, those which will qualify for public investoJ;·s, 
which will need public investing to get the kind of capital that their 
prospects will justify. Those are the companies by and large which 
suffer from a lack of access to the public market and from the impedi-
ments which the ERISA has created on the investment of institu-
tional funds. 
If ERISA did not create the fear, the fear of liability, and you 
really cannot blame the administrators of ERISA, Congressman 
Luken, because I think, on the whole, they have been quite respon-
sive in trying to ease these concerns. The problem is nobody knows 
what the <liability is and nobody will find out until the court speaks. So, 
there is quite a fear to invest pension money in anything e.xcept for 
the largest and most established-and only Congress can reduce that 
very soon. 
The other category is the business which never gets big enough to get 
outside financing, where they go to the family to put capital together, 
and to friends and neighbors, in localities all over America. Even these 
companies now have to register with the SEC to provide absolute as-
surance that an investor cannot change his mind and pull his money 
back. But fundamentally these businesses will have to grow on their 
internal forces of financing. 
I think as the cost and capital requirement of expanding businesses 
and of starting a business has increased with inflation, it is appropriate 
that consideration be given to increasing the surtax exemption. In-
creasing that portion of the earnings of a corporation which gets the 
benefit of a lower tax break. If $25,000 where the right amount 20 years 
ago it is probably $100,000, today. 
The second thing which would promote the preservation of internal 
flows of funds is SBIC financing. The more flexibility, the more invest-
ment can occur. 
Now, I have not made any comment with reference to SBA regula-
tions. You asked me to exprnss any of the task force solutions which 
I don't totally endorse. I must say I was pleased to see the Administra-
tor express his reservation about subsidies. I have the same resena-
tion about that. 
One final comment. Interest was expressed in how you increased the 
use and the investment that private banks, the private banks system, 
will take in small business financing. I have some experience in that, 
for almost 2 years I served as Chairman of the Export-Import Bank. 
vVe did succeed in increasing the amount, the. portion of export money 
that the commercial banks assumed in those transactions. We did it by 
a relatively simple process. vVe increased the price they had to pay for 
our guarantee from one-half percent a year to 1 percent a year and 
ma.ny assumed the risks themselves. Now, SBA charges over i percent 
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for the fuH guarantee of a 7-year loan. Eximbank charges a reasonable 
fee, one close to the market price. One percent over 7 years is a give-
away. So, everybody is going to want the guarantee. 
That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. LAFALCE. I have grave problems with that last one, but in keep-
ing with what I said earlier we will have the testimony of all the 
pane;lists before we have any questions. 
Mr.Lea~ 
Mr. LEA. Do you have a copy of my tes_timony ~ 
Mr. LAF ALCE. I believe I do. 
Mr. LEA. I will just read parts of the statement. 
I think that is a good report, this SBA task force report. I think it 
is a good report because it hits on my experience, which I have been in 
the business for-in the neighborhood of 25 years. It hits where we all 
live today. 
In general, I endorse the entire recommendation package of the task 
force report. There were a great many other recommendations that we 
could have included but this final report represents a very trim list. 
Nevertheless, I would like to particularly endorse several of these spe-
cific recommendations. On the basis of this trim list I would particu-
larly like to endorse several recommendations. 
The report has reflected one, and this is particularly the "rollover" 
recommendation where you provide capital gains taxes that is rein-
vested in small business. That is a very important provision that we 
see that would go a long way to bring an increased incentive for invest-
ment in smaller businesses. 
I also believe that there is a lot to be said for the underwriting tax 
reserve provision. This would be most useful. 
Under the ERISA provisions, the basket clause of 5 percent and the 
promotion of professionally managed pools of capital investing in the 
marketable securities of emerging companies strikes me as very timely. 
I look at all the SEC recommendations as necessary and minimum steps 
to correct an increasingly burdensome problem. 
'Ve reproduced a chart in this report which I have included in my 
statement.* This chart. takes you through each individual stage of in-
vestment from ,the time it starts out with an idea right through to the 
time where you get a $100 million company that is going into the mar-
ketplace on a day-to-day basis. 
Ten years ago it was that a few of us thought that with $200,000 or 
$300,000 you could probably get there, from 0 to $100 million in a pe-
riod of 10 years. Of course, that time has long gone. Right now what 
this chart is telling is that it takes between $5,000 up to $1 million and 
5 years of thought and labor to develop the idea or basis of a company 
that can have significant economic impact. Then it might require $2.5 
million and 3 to 6 years to organize and commercialize the production 
of the company to the point that it can break even on an annual basis. 
It may take between $4 million and $10 million of additional capital 
before the company can be considered to have reached the status re-
quired for a normal public offering. 
*Chart appears on p. 25. 
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In suggestin<Y this there is an authorized requirement in the neigh-
borhood of $7 ~illion to $7% million and a time span of a minimum of 
7 years to bring a company to a point that it might be truly on its own 
financially, having normal recourse to lending institutions and public 
stock markets. That is the kind of proposal that lands on my desk every 
da:&:ow, this is obviously a very long time to tie up capital without 
significant return. It is only at this point where we start dealing with 
rule 144 where we design a fair share starting process of trying to un-
lock it. So, if you own 20 percent of a company you can be, in theory, 
up to 10 years liquidating your position, and the 144, if that was the 
only access you had. 
Now, management of these new entries is also very difficult, and as 
there are in our particular investments, there are great casualties 
along the way. A lot of these we invest in just never make it. Yet it 
is the process described on this chart that holds the answer to increas-
ing employment and tax revenue in the United States in the years 
ahead. vVe must find a way to encourage this process. Otherwise we 
are doomed to stagnation, inflation, and ultimately disorder. 
Heretofore, particularly in the latter 1950's and in the 1960's we 
enjoyed financial markets conducive to this kind of activity. First, an 
entrepreneur with an economically sound idea could secure compe-
tent backing on favorable terms from the venture capital community. 
The venture capitalist could in turn secure credit for his companies 
from both banks and insurance companies if projected cash flow ap-
peared reasonable. These institutions could lend with some frequency 
and assurance to small companies so long as there was a reasonable 
appetite for new issues in the public stock market. Of course, this whole 
cycle of financial events has broken down with the collapse of the 
securities market for smaller companies and the withdrawal of the 
public investor. This, of course, has thrown a large part of the burden 
of carrying these emerging companies back on the venture capital com-
munity. To make my point, starting new enterprises today is not a 
Yery compelling business. 
Today the venture capital community is committing its funds very 
slowly to private transactions knowing that these funds will not be-
come available again for a very long time. Liquidity of portfolio-
always an important consideration-is doubly so today because in our 
business you must always remember when the people you have backed 
have no alternative source for new money for payroll or :for plant, 
your door must be kept open. 
Thank you for your courtesy and your attention. I will try to 
answer any question you have. 
That is my testimony. 
[The prepared statement of Charles L. L ea, Jr., follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. LEA, Ju., EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NEW 
COURT SECURITIES CORP., NEW YOHK, N.Y. 
l\fr. Chairman, I have a statement to make to this Subcommittee concerning 
the Report of the SBA 'l'ask Force on Venture and Equity Capital for Smull 
Business. 
First off, I am happy to be here and to be given this opportunity to discuss this 
report. In my opinion this is a very good report that sets forth a series of recom-
mendations that could ha>e a significant and powerfully beneficial effect on the 
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economic well being of this country. This may seem a self-serving statement 
from a contributor to the subject report and from one who earns his living from 
the field under review but these are views honestly held. 
In general, I endoxse the entire recommendation package of the Task Force 
Report. There were a great many other recommendations that we would have 
included but this final report represents a very trim list. Nevertheless, I would 
like to particularly endorse several of these specific i·ecommendations. Under 
the tax recommendations the so called "rollover" provision of qualified business 
investments and the underwriters tax reserve provision appear most useful. 
Under the ERISA provisions, the basket clause of 5 percent and the promotion of 
professionally managed pools of capital investing in the marketable securities of 
emerging companies strikes me ias very timely. I look at all the SIDC recom-
mendations as necessary and minimum steps to correct an increasingly burden-
some problem. 
Let me try to be useful to this inquiry by focusing your attention to the chart 
on page five of this report. 'l'he chart is entitled: 
LIFE CYCLE OF A NEW ENTERPRISE MODEL OF A HIGH-TECHNOLOGY PRODUCT COMPANY 
1975-76 FINANCIAL J\IARKET CONDITIONS 
What we are saying here is that a normal investment situation takes between 
$5,000 to $1,000,000 and up to five yea11s to develop the basis for a new com-
pany that may have s ignificant economic impact. It may require another $2.5 
million and three to six years to organize and commercialize the product and 
bring the company to the point that it can break even on an annual basis; and 
it will probably take between $4 to $10 million of additional capital ·before this 
company can be considered to have reached the status ~.-equired for a normal 
public offering. In sum this is an outside cap'ital requirement exclusive of re-
tained earnings of $7-$13 million and a time span of a minimum of seven years 
to bring a company to a point that it may be said to be truly on its own finan-
cially, having noxmal recourse to lending institutions and public markets for its 
capital requirements. This is obviously a very long time to tie up ciapital without 
significant :return. The management of these new enterprises is also very difficult 
and there are many casualties along the way. Yet it is the process described on 
this chart that holds the answer to increasing employment and tJax revenue in 
the United States in the years ahead. We must find a way to encourage this 
process. Otherwise we are doomed to stagnation, 'inflation, and ultimately 
disorder. 
Heretofore, particularly in the latter 1950's and in the 1960's we enjoyed finan-
cial markets conducive to this kind of activity. First, an entrepreneur with an 
economically sound idea could secure competent backing on favorable terms from 
the venture capital community. The venture capitalist could in turn secure credit 
for his companies from both banks and insurance companies if projected cash 
flow appeared reasonable. These institutions could lend with some frequency and 
assurance to small companies so long as there was a reasonable appetite for new 
issues in the public stock market. Of course, this whole cycle of financial events 
has broken down with the collapse of the securities market for smaller companies 
and the withdrawal of the public investor. 'l'his, of course. has thrown a large 
part of .the burden of carrying these emerging companies back on the venture 
capital community. To make my point, starting new enterprises today is not a very 
compelling business. 
Today the venture capital community is committing its funds very slowly to 
private transactions knowing that these funds will not become available again 
for a very long time. Liquidity of portfolio- always an important consideration-
is doubly so today because in our business you must always remember when the 
people you have backed have no alternati"ve source for new money for payroll or 
for plant, your door must be kept open. 
Thank you for your courtesy and your attention. I will try to answer any ques-
tion you have. 
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Mr. LAF ALCE. Thank you very much. 
Mr. Golder? 
. Mr. GoLDER. Thank you. I am delio·hted to be here, and also to be part 
of this task force which, I might add, is a very hard-working group. 
You have my prepared remarks and I will try not to read them, but I 
would like to make a few comments. 
I alluded in my remarks to the inadvertent adverse legislation on 
small business, and I was delighted to hear Mr. ·weaver make his com-
ment on div.idends. I will comment also on ERISA; that is, what I 
might call problems of the spilloff. 
I agree with Mr. ·weaver. Dividend integration creates capital but I 
don't think it is going to help the small business sector. 
To be specific on areas, I certainly concur generally with the report, 
as Mr. Lea did, and I think the SBIC program has been a good pro-
gram. It has paid good dividends to the Government. I also feel that 
the program has been more limited than had hoped for the reasons for 
which are touched on by rthe task force report. I feel that a subsidy of 
a portion of the leverage can be a useful tool •to move money into equity 
investment. In the present regulations there is no question that good 
economics force a manaO"er to collect interest because he has to pay 
interest, and .if he doesn~t pay it the SBA comes after him just like 
anyone else. So, the economics just force the debt-oriented investment 
philosophy. 
So, as one form of encouragement I do think that a subsidy of a 
portion of the interest could be helpful. I also think-as was already 
mentioned, that the tax laws clearly favor debt-type financing because 
of the ability to create reserves on loans but not on equity. Yet, when 
you are taking a high risk- a higher risk than you would in a loan, at 
least in a balance sheet sense, you are still not able to set up a reserve 
that is deductible for tax purposes. I think these are contradictory in 
practical economics and in intent. 
The third SBIC point which I would like to make is the need for an 
increase in the size standards. I just cannot emphasize, enough, the 
need for this. They were set in the late 1950's and although iqcreased 
recently, a large segment of the small or medium industry is in a "no 
man's" land today, as Mr. Lea indicated. They are too large for the 
SBIC and too small to have access to other sources. 
I am delighted that the SBA and Mr. Weaver are looking at these 
proposals. I think these are the factors that provide more jobs, and 
more taxes. We will get great benefits from having a size standard 
increase. 
Also, as Mr. Lea said, there is going to be some redundancy with 
this testimony. I think the liquidity for profitable investment is a 
very, very key area. The SEC problems of rule 144 are real. When we 
are wrong, we take our losses and that is the risk we are willing to 
accept. But if we are right, we want to be able to achieve our reward. 
This has become increasingly difficult due to the cost of registration 
and due to the restrictions of the SEC. 
Again, in the case of ERISA I think it was an inadvertent effect 
but a very important effect. 
The institutions do control such great percentages of the assets that 
if you eliminate them fr.om the market it is going to be very difficult 
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for Mr. Hambrecht to get them into the marketplace. Mr. Hambrecht 
does a good job in a different market. 
I think in talking to some investment managers that they clearly 
would like to invest but as Mr. Casey said, they are afraid of the un-
known. So, I strongly endorse the proposed changes in SEC and 
ERISA regulations. 
Another area that was touched on in the task force report that no 
one has mentioned is the question of value accounting. The SEC and 
the accounting bodies have required, or increasingly require, venture 
capital companies and owners to go to value accounting. This can be 
very difficult for those of us who are owned by public companies. De-
pending on how the interpretation of these rules go, we might have to 
review or reevaluate the desirability of making these kinds of risk 
investments if we are going to have extreme fluctuations in the profit-
loss account. 
Lastly, I would like to address something that is not in my testi-
mony that happened to me yesterday. I thmk it is worth telling. I 
was in Boston with a company we helped start 7 years ago. It was 
sold to a larger company. And after the formalities we were sitting 
around reflecting. Two of the entrepreneurs were there and I said, 
"Well, would you do it again?" They said, "I don't think so." I said, 
"Why?" I wish I would have had a recording there. The answer: 
"There is no incentive to do it. We took lower salaries. '"" e worked 
80 hours a week. We had a capital gains tax of 25 percent when we 
started. Today we have a capital gains tax of 50 percent." One of the 
men moved out of Massachusetts mto New Hampshire because of tax 
problems. He said, "' iVhX do it? I could 'make more in salary in indus-
try. Why take the risk? ' 
That, to me, was so telling and so reflective and was unsolicited. 
Then I told them where I was coming today and they asked that I 
reflect their attitude. The reward for taking risk is being removed 
from the economic system. 
That would conclude any formal remarks I have. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Golde;r follows: J 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF STANLEY C. GOLDER, PRESIDENT, F IRST CAPITAL 
CORPORATION OF CHICAGO 
My name is Stanley Golder , and I am President of First Capital Oorporation, 
a small business investment company, a nd its affiliate, First Chicago Investment 
Cor.poration, which is an investment company organized under the provisions 
of the Bank Holding Company Act. During 1975-76, I was Chairman of The 
Nationa l Advisory Council on Small Business Investment Companies to the 
Small Business Administration and am currently .an officer of The National 
Association of Small Business Investment Companies, and 'l'he National Venture 
Capital Association. I was pleased to be a member and paTticipant in the SBA 
Task Force on Venture and Equity Capital which report was .published in 
J ·anuary, 1977. 
First, let me say that I support the conclusions of the Task Force, and think 
that the recommell'dations therein, if completely accomplished, could significantly 
enhance the ability of smaller and medium-size companies to have access to 
capital. 
It is clear that our economic structure has provided us with more jobs and 
more wealth for more people than any other in the world. However, we have 
entered an age of consumerism in which Congress and various ·r egulatory bodies 
have enacted laws and regulations intended to provide protections of many kinds. 
The Task Force repor t clearly shows that growth of small business is important 
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to employment, taxes and innovations in technology. Too often the unintentional 
adverse effect of legislation and regulation on the small business environment 
may be equivalent to "throwing out the baby with the bath water." 
As requested in your invitation to appear !before your Committee I will try to 
limit my remarks to the specific recommendations of the Task Force, and com-
ment on those items which I consider the most significant. 
As the President of an SBIC and an investment company, my interests fall 
particularly toward those suggestions in the Task Force ireport which would 
apply to companies seeking public capital or companies which in the future 
might be seeking public capital. Therefore, my first comments would be on the 
section of the report dealing with the SBIC program. 
The SBIC program has paid good dividends to the Government in the form of 
new jobs and increased taxes. However, t he present form of the program has been 
more limited than some had hoped, for reasons which 'the '.!.'ask Force report 
touches on. At the present time Government leverage is provided on a 4 to 1 
basis at a full market rate of interest. The SBA is charged with collecting inter-
est on a semi-annual basis and if an SBIC does not earn this interest it clearly 
cannot pay it. Therefore, SBIC investment has tended toward "debt financing" 
rather than equity financing as originally intended. If it is desirable to have 
more investments in the form of equity which generally does not have a current 
income feature, the interest charge has to be reduced or eliminated on some por-
tion of the SBIC leverage, as suggested in the report. 
In this same regard, the tax laws also favor an SBIC investing in debt-type 
financings, as the tax laws do not permit a deduction from income for loss 
reserves on the equity portion of the investments. Obviously, there is a contradic-
tion between the intent of the law and practical economics. 
Third, still dealing with SBICs, as indicated in the chart on page 5 of the 
report, companies have to have a revenue level of $25 million or more before they 
can have access to a ll sources of finance, public, markets, insurance companies, 
etc. The SBA size standards were basically set in the late 1950s and, although 
increased recently in one category, still, in my opinion, leave a large segment 
of medium-size industry in no man's land where they are too large for SBIC 
standards and too small to have complete access to other financial sources. It is 
this portion of the industry, as the report indicates, that tends to provide more 
jobs and more revenue increases for the economy. Substantial increase in the 
size standards for SBIC investments would fill this void. 
The next area that is of importance to me is the question of liquidity for 
profitable investments. We, in this industry, whether SBIC or venture capitalists, 
are in the business of taking risks for which we seek reward. In some cases 
we are wrong and we take losses which we are willing to accept, if we can, rea-
sonably expect to achieve a reward on some of our investments. As shown on 
Page 13 of the Task Force Report, going public for young companies is almost 
impossible. It seems clear that the present rules of ERISA have created a concern 
in the minds of funds managers about buying stocks in over-the-counter and 
younger companies. This would appear to have a significant influence in reducing 
the appetite of investment bankers to underwrite younger companies as this 
tremendous institutional market is basically unavailable. Therefore, I support 
the proposed changes in ERISA legislation. 
Even when a public market can be achieved we find that the very narrow 
limits set on the use of Rule 144 by the SEC tends to make it more difficult for 
venture capital investors and SBICs to sell their stocks in successful companies. 
I strongly endorse the suggested changes in this Rule. 
As I indicated earlier, venture capital investments are often unintentionally 
affected by Congressional and regulatory action such as I mentioned in ERISA. 
Another unintentional adverse effect could result from the req'llirement by the 
SEC and accounting bodies that the illiquid securities of small companies 
should be valued at fair value. This is a highly subjective process which could 
cause problems for institutional and venture capital investors. This require-
ment to f!iO to strict "value accounting" and its uncontrollable effect on profit 
and lQSS, could cause our institution and others to reevaluate the viability of 
making these investments. 
There are many other areas, of course, which I could comment on, but I'm 
sure your other witnesses, both today and next week, will adequately cover 
them. 
I thank you for inviting me, and certainly would be glad to answer any 
questiOllls. 
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Mr. LAF ALCE. Before we go to the next witness, I have been a little 
remiss. I think, for the purpose of the record, it would be very good 
if each of you very briefly indicated your background and experience, 
which eminently qualified you to be members of the task force and 
which really makes your opinion of respect. 
Mr.Casey. 
Mr. CASEY. I have been a venture capitalist and a lawyer and chair-
man o,f the SEC and Under Secretary of State for economics and 
Chairman of the Import-Export Bank. I am now a lawyer. I might 
be a venture capitalist but I am __ a little nervous. 
Mr. LEA. Well, I have been, since 1953, a venture capitalist. I am 
executive vice president of the New Court Securities and New Court 
Securities manages probably one of the largest private pools of 
capital in the country. 
Mr. GOLDER. Since 1970 I have been !?resident of First Capital 
Corp. of Chicago which is in SBIC and its affiliate which is an in-
vestment company organized under the Bank Holding Company Act. 
We are both subsidiaries of First Chicago Corp. and we are one of the 
largest bank-related investment companies. 
I have also been chairman of the National Advisory Council on 
Small Business Investment Companies to the SBA until the beginning 
of this year. I am an officer of the National Venture Association and 
of the National Association of Small Business Investment Companies. 
Mr. LAFALCE. Mr. Hambrecht, before you give your testimony, your 
background, please. "' 
Mr. H AMBRECHT. I have been on the business scene since 1958. My 
partner and I formed an investment banking corporation on the west 
coast 9 years ago to provide an investment bank service to the small 
manufacturing companies. During the past 9 years we have managed 
and placed 35 venture, private financing, totaling $47 million and have 
manapd 36 public offerings for emerging companies totaling $141 mil-
lion . .tiecause of this background my particular role with the task force 
was to focus on the role of public financing for emerging companies. I 
think Mr. Lea and Mr. Golder very clearly spelled out the interconnec-
tions between venture capital and the public market. I think it is safe 
to say that without the eventual liquid ventures capital will eventually 
dry up or companies will go and solicit and get venture capital and it 
will sooner or later be forwarded in selling out or merging upstream to 
give the liquid stock to their investors. 
I think, Congressman, you did cite the figures in our report about 
the precipitous decline in activities for companies of under $5 million 
net worth in the public market. I would like to amplify on that. 
During this period of time that we talk about and showed in the 
report, the total public new money raised in total public offerings in-
creased about 50 percent. The number went roughly from $28 billion 
in 1969 to over $41 billion in 1975. So, I think it is very clear to us that 
the public market cut was bein~ designed so the small business com-
panies won't, though it was gettmg increasingly active. 
In the report and in our deliberations we talked a great deal about 
the reason why this happened. I think, obviously, you cannot ignore the 
market cycles nor the abuse of the market in the 1950's and the 1960's. I 
think the SEC has had hearings on this hot issue. I think there have 
98-184 0 - 77 - 3 
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been some very good new rules promulgated. There have been new 
achievements. I think there are now new and good safeguards against 
a return of new abuses in the new issue market. But I think it would be 
a dramatic mistake to say, "Let's just wait for the next market cycle, 
then the market cycle will change." 
I think the committee and the task force really came to the conclu-
sion that there is some basic structural change taking place in the 
money market that has basically caused this precipitous decline for 
underwriting for small companies. 
We talked to companies and asked them why they don't invest. They 
say, "I just don't want to." They put it in savings. Any number you 
look at now, 70 percent of the New York Stock Exchange trade activi-
ties is for the --
Mr. LAF ALCE. I am really frightened by that. 
Mr. HAMBRECHT. Well, the report also goes on to say pension funds 
have tripled since 1962 and the estimates by 1985 or not more than 
half of all available equity for investment will be in the hands of 
pension managers and they are inherently more conservative. I think 
ERISA has even increased that bias toward conservatism. I think all 
the bias in the world is not going to change the basic philosophy from 
individuals to professionals. 
Mr. LAFALCE. You are a fiscal conservative against fiscal conserva-
tism, 
Mr. HAMBRECHT. The second point is the conservation process which 
has been going on in the securities business. Underwriters are sold 
not because they are marketed by a system. In 1968 the brokers' com-
mission was adjusted and has been phased out through a period of 
1975. During that period the number of registered receipts, registered 
with the National Association of Security Dealers, has remained rela-
tively stable. We are about the same total number of sales members. 
But we have 35 percent fewer brokers dealing and it is precisely the 
small broker whom the small company used to call on to provide un-
derwriting and market advice. This man is being squeezed out of 
business. The decision making, the trade activities, the underwriting 
activities, the reserve activities, all tend to flow back when they are 
acquired by those larger firms and that just increases the problems 
for small companies in California, Massachusetts, or wherever they 
need the money to get the attention of the larite New York firms. 
To touch briefly on the recommendations, I feel there were three that 
are particularly close to my point of view and I think are very impor-
tant. First of all is ERISA. It has been mentioned by every panelist 
here. I think it is important to focus on the practical a"pects of 
ERISA. We have some testimony from the, or hearings from the 
Treasnry, that say it is not nearly as bad as that. Practical results 
of ERISA is that the major institutions will not invest in small com-
panies. I think you can document that. You can find institutions that 
now have policies that say, we will only invest in the top two capital-
izations or top 400. They do not understand ERISA. Therefore, they 
are defensive. I think the only practfral approflch is the basket clause, 
a clause that specifically spells out, "You are allowed to put w percent, 
2 percent, 5 percent, or whatever, in funds mandated for small com-
pany investing." 
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The best approach that I have seen is Stanford University. The 
trustees at Stanford have formed a policy for their money managers 
to follow, that essentially gives them a mandate to invest over a spec-
trum 0£ American business that is representative 0£ American busi-
ness as it is today. In other words, they are saying, i£ x percent 0£ 
our business activities is generated in large companies we should invest 
x percent and our other moneys should be spread over the entire 
spectrum 0£ sizes. 
The second suggestion I think is imperative is, i£ we are going to a 
return 0£ public markets the solution is to simplify and cheapen the 
registration process to go public. Mr. Casey spells out the costs. It just 
does not work because the thing to remember is that the company has 
to commit that money before they know the offering is going to be 
successful. So, he is gambling $100,000 before he knows he is going to 
get a dime back. Companies of $5 million in sales are not going to 
gamble 25 percent to try and go public. 
. The third thing we touched on in the report: I think it is obvious 
that we cannot go back to fixed commission rates. I do not want to. The 
investors' bank system is competitive. It ought to be competitive, but 
I do think there ought to be some incentive to be responsible to the 
marketing and to underwriting activities. I think, again, you can 
clearly prove this is inherently critical. You have good years and you 
have bad years. I think this is an activity that could very well justify 
a loss reserve, a reserve against future losses. 
Mr. LAFALCE. I am afraid those bells are going ,to ring shortly. I 
do want to move on. 
Mr. PEARSALL. It is a privilege to be here today. You have my writ-
ten statement. 
[Mr. Pearsall's prepared statement follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DUANE D. PEARSALL, PRESIDENT, STATITROL DIVISION,~ «.I. 
EMERSON ELECTRIC Co., LAKEWOOD, COLO. 5Sv.-~ 
My name is Duane D. Pearsall. I am President of the Statitrol Division, 
Emerson Electric Co., Lakewood, Colo. Until our merger with Emerson Electric 
in March of this year, Statitrol was an independent manufacturer of home 
smoke alarms and commercial smoke detectors. We were a small business, now 
13 years old, and because of our success, I was named by the Small Business 
Administration as Small Business Person of the Year for 1976. During the past 
year, I was appoint<>d by the Administrator, Mr. Mitchell Kobelinski, to serve 
on the 'l'ask Force on Venture and Equity Capital. 
This is my first appearance before a House Committee. Having made over 
forty speeches in this past year on behalf of small business, I am encouraged 
and gratified that the Task Force Report has reached the attention of this 
Committee. I sincerely hope the Committee will give careful consideration to 
each of the nineteen recommendations in order to halt the precipitious decline 
in access to capital now experienced by small and intermediate size businesSBs. 
It is my understanding that this Committee will be hearing testimony from 
the Honorable William J. Casey, Chairman of the SBA Task Force on Venture 
and Equity Capital. Mr. Casey should be commended for his leadership and per-
sonal accomplishment in managing to condense a monumental amount of data 
into a useful document. 
Therefore, I will confine my remarks to a description of the development of 
our Company which typifies a national problem, resulting in the erosion of the 
numbers of intermediate sized businesses in the United States. 
Our Company was formed in 1963 to manufacture a static control device 
intended to reduce electrostatic charges in photographic dark rooms. Using 
a homemade instrument to measure concentration of free ions, we accidentally 
cl<:.'! 
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discovered its sensitivity to smoke. This subsequently led to our development of a 
commercial ionization smoke detector. After 3 years of hand-to-mouth financing 
of the development of technical product, always on the verge of bankruptcy we 
convinced a small business investment company ( SBIC), in 1966, to invest $250,-
000, 7-year term, 8 percent note with warrants to purchase options on 49 percent 
of our outstanding stock. I would remind the Committee that in 1966. an inter-
est rate of 8 percent was considered exorbitant. Because of their sound financial 
a~vice and assistance, our relationships with SBIC, Central Investment Corpora-
tion of Denver, have been excellent. It proved to be a wise investment for both 
parties. 
Th~ee years later in 1969, with a gradually growing sales volume, we were able 
to bmld our first plant for $92,000, with the help of a 40 percent SBA direct loan. 
These special SBA funds involved an extremely complicated procedure which 
required that we hire an attorney at a cost of $2,000 to process the paper work. 
Under this program, involving a local development company program, we ended 
up with five mortgages on our building, one of which was issued to ourselves. This 
loan was subsequently replaced with a 90 percent SBA guarantee loan for a 
second plant expansion. 
In 1971, we introduced a battery powered home smoke alarm. In 1972, almost 
single handedly, with the help of a consultant, we influenced the International 
Conference of Building Officials, a national model building core organization, to 
require a home smoke alarm in new construction of one- and two-family resi-
dences and each apartment living unit. Its acceptance was followed by other 
model building codes, adopted by municipalities throughout the United States. In 
1976 there will be over eight million such devices installed in homes with a poten-
tial savings in lives measured in the hundreds. 
In late 1975, the first major U.S. corporation introduced a competitive device 
on national television. Although our own Company has grown dramatically, 
our market share today is less than 10 percent. To meet national competition, 
it is necessary not only to add research and dev-elopment staff and facilities, 
but also to progressively automate our production. 
By mid 1976, two of our major independent competitors, who were small 
businesses, became acquisitions of large corporations. We became visible in the 
market place as the largest independent smoke alarm manufacturer. However, 
we began to experience a rapidly decreasing share of the market. 
At this point, it became obvious that we could not generate capital through 
1
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internal sources in sufficient quantities to meet national competition. In review-
ing alternatives, our first choice was to become a public corporation. However, 
because of the unintended effects of ERISA (Employees' Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974) combined with the effects of SEC Rule 144, together with 
the anticipated costs of underwriting, we could not expect nor predict an accept-
able stock offering. As further consideration, our major stockholder would not 
be able to relieve equity due to the constraints of Rule 144. 
We considered starting an ESOT (Employees' Stock Option Trust), but after 
careful scrutiny, because it represents a stock sale to employees, it would not 
represent a sufficient multiple on earnings to justify and would injure fut.ure 
possibilities of a sale. Historically, ESOT's have been valuable as a low-multiple 
bail-out method for a low growth company. Again, this alternative was consid-
ered unacceptable. 
Other alternatives were reviewed, such as a leveraged asset method, the 
purchase of an existing but inactive public company, etc. . 
The final conclusion, and the only reasonable alternative, was to seek .a 
merger partner. This resulted in the acquisition of Statitrol by Emer~on Electnc 
Co., St. Louis, Mo., effective March 16, 1977. We are very pleased with our new 
partner and have a renewed confidence to approach the market place from a 
position of strength and with a new perspective. . 
The purpose of 1this testimony is that <;mr experience demonstr~tes v~ry 
clearly that the unintended effects of legislation, such as ERISA, combrned with 
constraints of SEC compounded by the inability to generate capital for growth, 
internally, is forctng the elimination of most intermediate sized, su.ccessful 
companies in the United States: At the ~ame t~me. th~se eJ_Iects contnbute to 
faster growth of major corporations, tendrng to rnstitutionahze the large manu-
facturing sector of our economy. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL REMARKS 
In my talks to over 3,000 small businessmen in the past year, major concerns 
of government intrusion involve the burden of government regulations. ERISA, 
for example, has created exorbitant costs in maintaining pension or profit shar-
ing plans. The combination of outside professional help in the form of legal and 
accounting services, together with the enormous paper work burden necessary 
to maintain their plans, smaller businesses, under 25 people, find it more prac-
tical to cancel. Minimum annual costs to maintain the smallest plan are esti-
mated at $2,000 to $2,500. Recently, insurance firms have started marketing 
standard format plans, reducing the cost somewhat, but the net effect is still 
prohibitive. Statitrol Corporation, with an average of 650 employees, expended 
an estimated $13,000 in costs to maintain the simplest, most liberal form of 
profit sharing plan possible in 1976. Since most plans require these costs to be 
deducted from annual contributions, the burden of maintenance is on the em-
ployee. We find, ironically, that a typical employee is sacrificing his retirement 
income in order to comply with government regulations. In addition, of course, 
his taxes support the agency. 
Another major concern of small business is the almost insurmountable problem 
of product liability. Many small businesses feel they are living on borrowed 
time because they are walking in the shadow of a product liability suit which 
guarantees, in most cases, absolute disaster. 
My final point involves a recommendation for new legislation for the very 
small, or "mini" business. Since the definition of small business is necessarily 
complicated and encompasses some fair sized companies, there seems to be a need 
to identify the really small business, such as under 10 employees, or with gross 
receipts under $500,000. 
Recommendation-new legislation which will allow a precisely defined "mini" 
business to be exempt from regulations of independent agencies such as OSHA, 
EPA, ERISA, etc. Such a bill might well restore confidence among several 
small business owners. 
It has been a privilege and an honor to appear before you today. I hope I 
can always be considered as a spokesman for small business. As a body, we have 
been the victims of unintended effects of legislation. The resultant negative 
effects, together with the increasing burden of government paper work, have 
undermined the very foundation of our small business sector and, in so doing, 
has already seriously eroded the foundation of our free enterprise system. 
Thank you very much. 
Mr. PEARSALL. I want to leave one impression. First, my background 
is 22 years as a small businessman. The first 18 years I was a very, very 
small businessman with less than 10 employees. In the past 4 years 
we have been very successful. As a result, last year I received the SBA 
award as the National Small Business Person of the Year. Receiving 
that award allowed my name to be appointed to this task force. I have 
thus been cloaked in some wisdom that is not justified. It was not there 
before the award. It is not there now. But, in the past year I have had 
the opportunity to speak to probably 3,000 small business persons 
either in service clubs or chambers of commerce, et cetera. 
I served on the board of two chambers of commerce and I am on the 
Executive Committee of the Council of Small Business of the U.S. 
Chamber-which is the new Council of Small Business-which is 
out to improve the image of the U.S. Chamber in Washington. 
My purpDse in being on this committee has served an additional pur-
pose. As we began to study the venture capital problem it became clear 
that our company proved to be an example of what was happening 
to small businesses, or more accurately, the intermediate-sized business 
sector in the United States. I just want to call your attention to the 
period of time where it became critical that we make a decision on 
how to secure additional capital financing. It is very fresh in my mind 
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because as of March 1977, we became a part of a large corpora:ion. 
My first choice was not to become part of big business. I would much 
prefer to have been a public company. I have had the counsel of the 
members of this committee, including the chairman, who tried to help. 
Bill Hambrecht also tried to help me. 
Unfortunately, the public market would not produce the return that 
our major stockholder would require. Our major stockholder was an · 
SBIC. 
I would like to emphasize the management assistance aspect of 
SBA that President Carter discussed with Mr. Weaver. I feel the 
SBIC in our case provided the business management assistance to our 
company. But, the final issue that bothers me is a deep concern. Any 
company that is innovative or growing, needs money for continued 
growth to meet competition. 
In my case, as a successful company we created competition with 
major corporations. We are now only a small part of a $200 million 
market which we really almost singlehandedly generated. To get that 
capital we have had to go to big business. We investigated the ESOP 
Congressman Marriott alluded to. Our reasons against the ESOP was, 
that historically it has been used as a low multiple bail out for low-
growth companies. 
It does not provide the return to its major investors an SBIC that 
would be required. We looked at all alternatives, for instance1 a lever-
age method where it required a high capital-intensive operation to be 
effective. 
We have had the best advice of any company in our position and 
the alternatives from which we had to choose forced us to become part 
of big business. I am not apologizing for that. Frankly. I have become 
a very wealthy man as a result of it, but it was not my first choice, and 
I do not think it is inconsistent with any successful entrepreneur. 
I am pleased that the committee has taken this task force report 
seriously. I do not want to digress from the report more than is abso-
lutely necessary. My priorities relative to the report are, No. 1, the 
reinvestment capability of investors in small businesses to reinvest in 
another small business with the privilege of deferred capital gains tax 
treatment. 
The second point, and I would like to emphasize, is that three of 
the members of this committee represented very small businesses. We 
had a lot of discussion about SEC requirements and public offerings 
but there were three of us that were concerned with the very small 
businesses. The only significant help that can be made to that segment 
is to change the surtax exemption. We recommended simply doubling 
the present-to $100,000. I think that is very important, and I do not 
want it to be overlooked. It may be tough to get, but it is extremely 
important. 
The third problem is ERISA. From the standpoint that it restricts 
investment in small businesses in the public market and is a major 
factor in preventing a reasonable price or reasonable liquidity poten-
tial on sale to the public market. 
I must also comment on what Congressman Luken and Congress-
man Marriott referred to and that is the paperwork burden of ERISA. 
It is horrible. Just this week, and that is why it is so prominent, we 
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chai~ged our only program for the third time. When I say changed 
our program I mean a whole new legal document because of the subse-
quent interpretations of ERISA. It is a monster. It has caused the 
elimination of more prnsion profit-sharing plans than at any other 
time in our history. I have not found a small business who will ac-
knowledge an annual cost of less than $2,000 to $2,500 a year just to 
handle the paperwork and reporting requirements. The alternative 
is to cancel the program. That is what is happening. I think ERISA 
is a growing monster. Each change we have made in our plans has 
reduced the benfits to our employees. 
It now prevents us from paying off a profit-sharing account in less 
than 1 yrar. This has to do with an interpretation of how forfeitures 
must be applied subsequent to the termination of an employee, should 
the employee come back to work for you. It is a complicated, unneces-
sary mt of interpretations and regulations in my view. I apologize 
for the d; gression. 
I want to make one other point. There is talk of moving out of the 
double dip tax on dividends. I disagree with taxes on dividends. It is 
morally wrong. I would call attention to pursuing the task force rec-
ommendations as they are now very important. When the dividend 
tax is removed it further draws capital away from small business in 
a irross manner. I have a major frustration in this area. 
I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Thank you very much. 
INTERVENING TESTIMONY BY Srx TASK FORCE PANELISTS 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Mr. Weaver, this may be a little bit unusual. I was de-
lighted that you remained for the presentation of all the panelists. I 
wonder if I could ask you to become a member of this panel? 
Mr. WEAVER. I would be delighted. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Thank you very very much. 
While I might address a question to one particular individual, I 
would ask any individual to comment. While I may be the official ques-
tioner, I would rather that this now take the format of a discussion 
among the seven of us. I think it might be much more fruitful that way. 
I will be the moderator, if you will, of this discussion. 
To start it off, Mr. Hambrecht, you .indicated that the figures in 1969 
from public financing were $21 billion. Is that correct? 
Mr. HAMBRJ<]CHT. That is correct. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. What portion was for national public financing and 
what percent was to raise equity capital from your company? I think 
that major corporations were in need of additional capital and very 
often with a tight money market had to choose the public offering route. 
Mr. HAMBRECHT. I do not have those numbers with me. They are 
available. I can tell you a gut feeling that there were very few official 
offerings either for small or large groups. 
Mr. CASEY. It would be a very small proportion. 
Mr. HAMBRECHT. I think we are talking about $40 billion. It is only 
1 pP.rcent of national public offerings. . . 
Mr. LAFALCE. So, it cuts across the board not only for small busi-
nesses but also for large businesses, too. 
\ 
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Mr. IilMBRECHT. Except I think the point is that most of the larger 
companies who have a need to or wanted to go public are there already. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. I am concerned that this report does not focus in 
enough on the truly small. Mr. Pearsall, in your testimony you called 
for d1stinguishins- small businesses and mini businesses or "small small" 
businesses. That is why I was especially interested in your priority to 
increase the surtax exemption and perhaps the recommendation which 
would best affect the truly small businessman. I think that would truly 
address this. Is there any other way of addressing this equity in ven-
ture capital problem other than this i 
Mr. PEARSALL. I think the SBA can play a major role through their 
VISTA and SCORE programs and building a management expertise 
because man11.gement is a major characteristic but there are many small 
businesses that are not growth oriented, that is the day-to-day business 
and the small one- and two-man business. I think internal generation of 
capital is the only hope for them. 
Mr. CASEY. They cannot get it from the public. There are only two 
ways you can deal with it: One is for Government to get it, and the 
other is to let the Government let them keep it. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. That is if they have no access other than through the 
Government or themselves. 
Mr. GoLDER. I think it is important, Mr. Chairman-that you under-
stand that there was a lot of discussion and I think we were all very 
interested. But people in this position often do not want outside inves-
tors and that was very clearly brought out. This is the very small busi-
nesses we are talking about. There were those people represented at a 
panel group. They really do not seek outside investors so the internal 
generation lets them keep more. Let them have faster depreciation, 
lower tax rates. It seems to be the only conclusion. 
Mr. CASEY. We spent a lot of time trying to develop measures to 
address the medium or smaller businesses. We just were unsuccessful. 
Mr. LAFAI,cE. Most. of your recommendations a.re about a small busi-
ness that has already been formed-that has potential for expansion-
and you are trying to focus in on how you help this kind of business 
achieve this type of potential that it has. That is a tremendous prob-
lem. I think it might be concerned more with high technology types of 
businesses, too. But I do not think that this addresses the greater prob-
lem of the great n111JTiber of truly small busi1 esses in the country. I 
do not know whether this report has focused in enough on this problem. 
Mr. CASEY. We just did not come up with anything. All we could 
come up with was a loan program. Mof"t of them are going to the banks, 
but if they are out of that maybe the SBA will help-but that does not 
finance equity growth. 
Mr. ARONSON. That was the question I was going to ask you. You 
said the answer is not for very small businesses. The commercial banks, 
and indeed the SBA, have programs for the very small to acquire 
capital. 
Mr_ CASEY. That is not equity capital. They use it for equity. It is 
not equity but it is used that way. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. They do not even have working capital, and they fold. 
That is the problem. I hate to be so pessimistic. 
37 
M~. CASEY. What we came up wit~ was, _let the~ keep more of their 
earnmgs, and let them charge off their capital eqmpment faster which 
keeps cash in the business. 
Mr. GOLDER. I have to comment on your suggestion that they fold 
for that reason alone. They fold because of two things that occur. 
Maybe they are the same thing. 
Mr. Pearsall tall~ed abou it, lack of management expertise and 
counsel, but many times they refuse to accept the counsel that is given 
to them. They do not take too much loan money. They will overextend 
themselves because they do not want equity investors. I have seen many 
cases, where people come in to see us and they will say, I do not care 
what interest you charge. You cannot have one share of stock. 
There is nothing we can do about that attitude. 
Mr. HAMBRECHT. I have just one thing. I think it is important to 
unders' and that capital needs are much a function of growth. In other 
words, ~f your busmess profits are low and you are not growing very 
fast, you really do not need capital from outside. They can do it from 
your own cash flow. That is why we are confronted with companies 
·with growth promise. They are the companies that have been most suc-
cessful at job creation, at creating an asset, at creating business. 
The smaller businessman who is not really building a business, if 
he cannot run it on cash flow then he deserves to fold. He is not operat-
ing properly. 
Mr. WEAVER. We have seen small businesses refuse to accept our 
advice because we are the Government. We are the Feds. For that 
reason-that is not an exaggeration. For that reason we are hopeful 
that our SBIC's small business opportunity for colleges and our eight 
pilot university development centers using the third party approach, 
the business school, may let small businesses accept the.ir advice a little 
quicker and more directly. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. I want you to know that not only because of its effect 
on capital, but because management is a concern of this subcommittee, 
we do intend in the future to have hearings on the management problem 
and how the SBA might address it. Particularly, we want to look into 
the university development centers and possible expansion of that pro-
gram. I do think that the principal reason most businesses fold is lack 
of management ability. I am very interested in t~e. VISTA and 
SCORE programs, but I am doubtful just how effective those volun-
teer programs can be. 
Gentlemen, we can go on endlessly. But, there is a recorded v~te _ 
right now. I also think there is a recoroed vote subsequent to this. 
So I am going to adjourn this hearing this morning but I want to 
again express my very very great thanks and again tell you that your 
work and efforts will not just gather dust and I will soo to it that there 
is considerable attention given to it. 
[Whereupon, at 11 :25 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon-
vene subject to call of the Chair.] 
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SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO EQUITY AND 
VENTURE CAPITAL 
WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1977 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT 
AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 
Washington, D.O. 
The subcommittee met at 9 :40 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 
2359, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J. LaFalce (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding. 
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LaFALCE 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Gentlemen, the subcommittee will come to order. 
T~,_Q~ begin..§..ita..2~cond dB.¥ .QLhearin,gs on the 
subject of the small hui.i'"<ii>sm.:u1.'a.access to venture.and equity capit!ll. 
In our first hearing, we were fortunate to have the views of a num-
ber of individuals who participated on the SBA task force on this 
subject as well as the new Administrator of the SBA. 
A good many of you were present as observers. We certainly re-
ceived some informed views last week, and this morning we have, of 
course, a number of equally qualified witnesses. We have a number 
of witnesses, and I hope there will be lively discussion after the testi-
mony is heard. 
I would like to call up all of the individuals who will be testifying 
this morning and have each of you in order give your testimony or a 
summation of it. Then we will have questions from the congressional 
panel, and then a discussion among the panelists. We have with us 
Mr. Lamar E. Ozley, Jr., Mr. James F. Hansley, Prof. Patrick R. 
Liles, Mr. M. William Benedetto, Mr. Russell L. Carson, and Mr. 
Walter B. Stults. 
Mr. Ozley, president-elect of the National Association of Small 
Business Investment Companies, would you please begin i 
TESTIMONY OF LAMAR E. OZLEY, 1R., PRESIDENT-ELECT, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANIES, 
DALLAS, TEX.; ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER B. STULTS, EXECU-
TIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION QF SMALL 
BUSINESS INVESTMENT COM:P ANIES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Mr. OzLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I might note for the record that the schedule of witnesses reflects 
that I am from New York. You have probably suspected by now that 
that is in error. 
(39) 
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I am Lamar Ozley, chairman, Interstate Venture Capital Corp., a 
privately owned SBIC with its office in Dallas. In addition, I serve 
this year as president-elect of the National Association of Small Busi-
ness Investment Companies, the trade organization which represents 
over two-thirds of all licensed SBIC's and MESBIC's. 
Our members account for about 90 percent of the billion dollars of 
assets in the SBIC industry today. Accompanying me today is Walter 
B. Stults, executive vice president of NASBIC. 
On behalf of the industry, I wish to thank you for initiating this 
series of hearings on the important subject of the ability of small busi-
ness to raise equity and venture capital. 
I believe this area is one of the two or three most crucial problems 
in our national economic life. Fortunately, the SBIC experience over 
the past 18 years has given us some insights into methods for increas-
ing the flow of equity dollars to new and growing businesses, so your 
hearings and recommendations have the potential for pointing out 
solutions to the present problem. 
COMMENTS oN THE REPORT OF SBA's TASK FoRcE 
Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that we applaud the very 
fine work of the SBA Task Force on Venture and Equity Capital, 
headed by William Casey. 
NASBIC supports all 19 of the task force recommendations, many 
of which are also part of our own redesign package. We shall add cer-
tain proposals of our own, but the task force furnishes a firm base for 
these other recommendations. 
We believe it is most significant that this group of eminent and 
hig:hly qualified individuals-all but three of them from outside the 
SBIC industry-came to the same fundamental conclusions as 
NASBIC did. 
The Casey task force concluded that "venture capital for new and 
growing small businesses has become almost invisible in America to-
day." N ASBIC agrees with that finding and will expand slightly upon 
it in the next section of this testimony. 
At this point, I also call the subcommittee's attention to the report 
submitted last December to the Secretary of the Treasury by the 
Treasury Small Business Advisory Committee on Economic Policy. 
Most of its recommendations closely parallel those in this NASBIC 
testimony and it specifically stated that: "We strongly urge the Treas-
ury Department to give its full support to the Casey task force's 
proposals." 
I ask unanimous consent that the Treasury Department Advisory 
Committee Report be included in the hearing record as a part of my 
remarks. 
Mr. LAFALCE. Without obiPrtion. it will be included. 
[The report referred to follows : ] 
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TREASURY SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC POLICY REPORT 
OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, DECEMBER, 1976 
Table of Contents-Recommendations: 
A. General 
B. Tax policy 
C. Equity capital 
D. Long-term credit 
E. Government paperwork and regulation 
During a meeting of the Advisory Committee on December 7, 1976, the Treas-
ury Small Business Advisory Committee on Economic Policy adopted and pre-
sented to the Secretary of the Treasury the following set of recommendations. 
The Committee requested that the Secretary of the Treasury present the rec-
ommendations to the new Administration and new Secretary of the Treasury ; 
and the Committee voted that the following report be attached to the transition 
briefing material presented to the new Secretary of the Treasury. 
A. GENERAL 
1. We recommend and think it is essential that this Advisory Committee spend 
a great deal of its available time creating an awareness and understanding 
of small business concerns within Treasury, the IRS and other regulatory 
agencies. We further believe that this effort should take place at both the Pres-
idential appointment level and Civil Service level and that it should focus on the 
problems, the nature, and the needs of small business. 'l'herefore. we propose that 
the Secretary of the Treasury communicate on behalf of this Committee to the 
representatives of the new Administration our· hope that President-elect and his 
tax advisers will consider: 
(a) The relative needs of large and small businesses for tax reduction as a 
stimulus to growth, and 
( b) The relative share of large and small companies in .the benefits of any 
tax reductions. 
2. We recommend the continuation of the Small Business Advisory Committee 
to the Treasury Department. 
3. We recommend the appointment of an Assistant Secretary or a Special 
Assistant to the Secretary for Small Business- a person who reports directly to 
the Secretary. 
B. TAX POLICY 
Recognizing that Federal taxation has the greatest adverse impact on capital 
formation for the bulk of all sma'll independent business, the Committee ranked 
tax policy as its highest priority. In principal we support H.R. 13687, the COSIBA 
small business tax bill, but we have focused on several items which we recom-
mend for adoption or study. The first three items constitute the principal rec-
ommendations of the Small Business Administration Venture and Equity Capital 
Task Force chaired by William Casey. 
1. Adjustment of depreciation schedules 
A taxpayer would be permitted to write off any amount up to and including 
100% of an asset value in year of acquisition. 
Limitation: $200,000 per year, in the case of eligi\Jle property and $200,000 per 
year, in the case of real estate. 
2 . .Adjustment of corporate rates 
Revise the existing corporate tax rate structure to reflect the following 
changes: 
Taxable income 
T= rate, 
percent 
$0-$9,999 ----------------------------------------- -------------------
$10,000-$49,999 ------------------------------------------------------
$50,000-$199,999 -----------------------------------------------------
$200,000-$ over ------------------------------------------------------
3. Transfers of stock in qualified small business corporations 
0 
12. 5 
25.0 
48.0 
If an investment is made in a qualified small business concern (per established 
SBA guidelines) subsequent to January l, 1977 and is ultimately disposed of after 
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a two-year h olding period at a gain, taxation of the gain will be deferred i! the 
proceeds are reinvested in a qualified small business concern (per established 
SBA guidelines). 
Gain would be recognized on a current basis to the extent that proceeds from 
the sale exceed the amount reinvested. 
4. Increased surtaa: ea:emption 
As an emergency, temporary action pending adoption of all of these tax rec~m­
mendations, we strongly support the increase of the corporate surtax exemption 
to $100,000. 
5. Income averaging 
We recommend that corporations be able to "income average" by permitting 
them to carry-over unused surtax exemptions. We suggest a 3-year carry back 
or a 5-year carry forward or 8-year carry forward similar to the net operating 
law provisions in the 1976 Tax Reform Act. 
6. Partial deduction for the cost of equity 
We feel that proposals for tax integration through a credit given on the pay-
ment of dividends by corporate taxpayers is seriously deficient and would have 
an adverse affect on small business. We believe that the proposal outlined by 
Professor Anthony in the November 29 issue of the Wall Street Journal of fur-
ther investigation and evaluation. We, therefore, recommend that Treasury con-
sider and analyze Professor Anthony's proposal. 
7. Accumuiated earnings 
We recommend that accumulated earnings of corporations be allowed to rise 
to $500,000 instead of the current accumulation ceiling of $150,000 and that regu-
lations be written to state clearly what will be considered to be an unreasonable 
accumulation. 
8. Taa: payment Umitation 
We recommend that the total Federal tax payments during any year (the 
current year's estimated tax payments, plus the amount due on the previous 
year's tax liability) shall not exceed 125 percent of the prior year's tax liability. 
This provision would affect only a small number of firms growing at a rapid rate. 
Any amounts carried on to the following year shall bear interest at the current 
rate required for late payment. 
9. Working capital investment credit 
The present tax investment credit is biased in favor of those firms which utilize 
capital equipment. We recommend studying a proposal that would allow a 10 
percent tax credit on the first $250,000 earnings for all businesses, whether or not 
they could use the investment credit provisions of the present code. 
10. Taa: credit for those who make SBA-guaranteed loUln8 
A credit of 20 percent of the gross interest income would be an easy recom-
mendation to administer and would give a great incentive for banks to generate 
SBA-guaranteed loans and for institutional investments to purchase the guar-
anteed portion of such loans. The Treasury Department has recommended this 
action in 1970 and 1971, and we support it fully. 
11. We specifically request that the Secretary call to the attention of the eco-
nomic advisors to the President-elect a study prepared for the use of the Sub-
committee on Economic Growth of the Joint Economic Committee; "Employment 
Tax Credit as a Fiscal Policy Tool." 
12. We recommend that the new Administration give the most serious con-
sideration to an employment tax credit which will in some measure put a 
premium on employment in the independent small business sector of the economy 
as against either government or large corporation. 
13. We request that the Treasury staff comment specifically on the method-
ology and conclusions contained in the econometric study conducted by Messrs. 
Fethke and Williamson and to reconsider and review estimates they have fur-
nished to us of the net cost of the job creation tax credit. 
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C. EQUITY CAPITAL 
The government estimates that small business faces an annual shortfall of 
equity capital for the next ten years of some $7 or $8 billion. This is a tremendous 
sum for the sector of our economy which has practically no access to the public 
securities markets or to institutional sources of funds. We make specific recom-
mendations in three areas: 
1. ERISA 
Either by statutory amendment or by Executive Branch cooperation among 
the Treasury and Labor Departments and the Small Business Administration, 
the fiduciaries responsible for investing the $210 billion of pension funds should 
be told that small business investments are as permissible and acceptable as 
any others within the "prudent man rule" of the statute. We find the inability 
of Treasury to clarify the meaning of the "prudent man rule" because it falls 
under the Department of Labor's jurisdiction-and Labor's apparent unwilling-
ness to do so-most harmful to the interests of a free enterprise-economy. 
2. Securities laws and regulations 
a. By legislation or regulation, there must be an increase in the present limita-
tion on Regulation A offerings up to at least $2 million. 
b. Rule 144 should be amended to allow those who invest in new and small 
businesses to recycle their funds more promptly; thus allowing them to invest in 
more new and small firms. 
c. The private offering exemption under Rule 146 should be studied carefully 
to see if that exemption cannot be made more useful to small businesses. 
3. Venture capital companies and SBIO's 
The SBA Task Force under the leadership of William Casey is presently con-
sidering a number of recommendations for increasing the effectiveness and aug-
menting the resources of this most important segment of the financial community. 
We shall not duplicate that group's work, but we strongly urge the Treasury 
Department to give its full support to the Casey Task Force's proposals. 
D. LONG-TERM CREDIT 
Academicians might consider that credit is an appropriate topiC for a group 
studying "capital formation." Real life proves, however, that a five-year loan is 
as close as many small businesses get to outside capital. Certainly, we believe 
that no one would doubt that it is preferable for smaller firms to have the bulk 
of their liabilities in the form of term loans, rather than 90-day lines of credit 
or commercial finance funds on an equally short basis. For that reason, we recom-
mend two proposals as a spur to the availability of small businesses to obtain 
long-term credit. The first proposal-a tax credit for those who make SBA-
guaranteed loans-is listed as item 10 under the tax policy section above. The 
second proposal is SBA Support for Restructuring Short-Term Debt. 
SBA guidelines discourage banks from restructuring a small firm's loans even 
though it might be in the best interests of the small business. We would recom-
mend that SBA regulations permit banks to roll over their lines of credit or 
shorter loans into a term loan, up to seven yea·rs. SBA might wish to make its 
guarantee for less than 90 percent, but we do not feel that the fear of sharp 
dealings by a few should automatically rule out actions which would be most 
helpful to small business. 
E. GOVERNMENT PAPERWORK AND REGULATIONS 
1. We recommend that the next IRS Commissioner, Secretary of the Treasury 
and the Director of OMB all participate actively and directly in the Commission 
on Paperwork and Regulatory Reform. We also recommend that the Treasury 
and IRS work more closely on paperwork reduction. 
2. With the advent of the computer along with our present ability and high 
technology, we recommend that all government agencies work toward achieving 
the goal of two reports per year, one for tax data and one for non-tax data. This 
would force better control and justification of public reporting requirements and 
regulations. We recommend that Treasury take the lead in this endeavor. 
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[From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 1976] 
EQUITY CAPITAL ANIJ DIVIDEND TAXATION 
(By Robert N. Anthony) 
Most observers agree that measures to stimulate the formation of capital are 
urgently nee<led. Without such measures, some estimates are that there will be a 
"capital shortage" of billions in the next decade. 
Most observers also agree that the capital shortage is caused in part by the fact 
that the Internal Revenue Code discriminates against equity capital, as compared 
with debt capital. 'fhe interest on debt capital is a tax deductible expense, so the 
real cost of debt capital to a company is only half its pretax cost. There is no 
corresponding tax deduction for the cost of equity capital, so its real cost is 
equal to its pretax cost. Thus, the effective cost to the company of funds obtained 
from a 9% bond issue is 4.5%, while the effective cost of funds obtained by the 
sale of common stock at a price that investors expect to return them 12% is the 
full 12%. 
This difference between the effective cost of debt capital and of equity capital 
is so great that companies are strongly motivated to use debt capital as a source 
of funds to the point where debt/equity ratios are dangerously high. The dis-
astrous experience of real estate investment trusts is in part traceable to the 
thinness of the equity portion of this method of real estate :financing. The economy 
cannot expand at an acceptable rate and with a sound capital structure unless 
the flow of equity capital is large enough to provide a proper balance with debt 
capital. 
Most tax reform proposals designed to redress the balance between debt capital 
and equity capital involve giving special tax treatment to distributed profits, 
that is, to dividends. Dividends are the only corporate distributions that are taxed 
twice, once at the corporate level and a second time as income to the recipients. 
Wages, salaries, debt interest, and rent are taxed only once, as income to the 
recipients. Income of unincorporated businesses is also only taxed once, to the 
recipients. Relief from this double taxation of dividends would appear to correct 
this imbalance, thus making equity capital relatively more attractive and creat-
ing the necessary impetus for equity capital formation. 
TWO APPROACHES 
Two general approaches are proposed. One is to make dividends, or some 
fraction of dividends, a tax deductible expense at the corporate level. The other 
is to exclude dividends, or some portion of dividends, from taxable income of 
the recipients. Unfortunately, there are serious defects in each of these proposals. 
If dividends were made tax deductible at the corporate level, the result 
obviously would be that the effective cost of new equity capital would be reduced, 
and this would make obtaining new equity capital more attractive to the corpora-
tion. This is good. But the result also would be that corporate boards of directors 
would be under pressure to pay out a large fraction of earnings as dividends, 
because the larger the dividends the lower the corporate income tax. Since 
total corporate earnings are either distributed or retained, the larger the frac-
tion that is distributed, the smaller is the amount retained. Currently, retained 
earnings are about six times as large as the amount of equity capital raised 
from new stock issues. 
The corporate income tax would become, in effect, a tax on undistributed 
profits, and thus discourage the retention of earnings. 
In 1958, West Germany instituted a dividend deduction at the corporate level 
for the express purpose of encouraging the flow of corporate earnings into 
German financial markets, thereby rebuilding those markets. The New York 
Stock Exchange favors such an approach. Although the stock exchange uses 
the stimulation of equity capital formation as its basic argument it is possible 
that the additional brokerage fees that would presumably be ge~erated as in-
creased dividends are reinvested is relevant in its thinking. 
But the distribution of income as dividends and its reinvestment by the recipi-
ents either in the same company or in other companies does not create additional 
capital. It merely shifts the source of capital from retained earnings to new 
equity financing. Indeed, unless recipients reinvested all the additional divi-
dends, which is unlikely, the effect could be a net reduction in total capital 
formation. 
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The alternative approach, in which dividends are made wholly or partially 
tax-exernpt to the recipients, has two flaws. 
First, the tax relief relates only to that part of the cost of equity capital 
which is paid out in dividends. Total equity costs are almost always higher 
than dividends, and since the fraction of the total cost that is represented by 
dividends varies from company to company, the impact would be uneven. In 
particular, investors in rapidly growing companies would be penalized; these 
companies cannot pay high dividends because they need to retain earnings for 
growth. 
The other problem with this approach is that the American public is likely 
to regard even a partial dividend exemption as unpalatable. Dividends are 
thought of as something rich people get, and dividend income as being unearned 
income. Moreover, it would be difficult to explain why the person who receives 
interest is treated differently from the person who receives dividends, since 
both are payments for the use of capital. Interest would be a dedm:tion at the 
corporate level and income to the recipient, but dividends would not be a deduc-
tion at the corporate level and would not be income to the recipient. 
The basic trouble with any dividend approach is that it assumes implicitly 
that dividends are the cost of equity capital in approximately the same sense 
that interest is the cost of debt capital. This is not the case. Interest is the 
cost of debt capital. For equity capital, however, dividends are only a fraction 
of the true cost. The dividend yield on listed common stocks averages roughly 
3% of market value which obviously is far less than the r eal cost of equity 
capital. 
What is needed is a method of removing the tax discrimination against equity 
capital that is not geared to dividends. There is a simple, practically loophole-
proof way of doing this: Allow corporations to take a tax deduction that is 
related directly to the amount of their equity capital. That is, allow a certain 
percentage of shareholders' equity as a deductible expense on the corporate 
income tax. 
Such proposals to record the cost of equity capital have been made in other 
contexts, but they have been largely ignored by practical people. Practical people 
know that there is no objective way of calculating a company's true cost of 
equity capital, and they therefore have assumed that there was no practical 
way of implementing such a proposal. 
A PRACTICAL WAY 
There is in fact a practical way. It is simply for the Congress to establish 
a percentage which would be applied uniformly to the shareholders' equity of 
all corporations somewhat below the average company's cost of capital. It might 
be thought of as a "prime equity rate," analogous to the prime rate on medium 
term debt. In order to phase it in gradually, the tax deduction could be, say, 
2% of shareholdE>rs' equity in the firf<t year, gradually increasing to a top in the 
neighborhood of 7%. (Many companies apply a rate of 5%, 6%, or 7% to share-
holders' equity to arrive at a deduction from income which is used in calculating 
the size of the bonus pool for executive compensation.) 
The great advantage of this proposal is that it is completely unrelated to 
dividends. Consequently, directors can select the balance between dividendi:i 
and retained earnings that best fits the company's needs without the pressure 
that special tax treatment of dividends would cause. 
A tax deduction for only a portion of the cost of equity capital would not 
eliminate entirely the disparity between equity capital and debt capital, but 
netiher would favorably tax treatment for dividends, unless the law motivated 
companies to pay out all earnings as dividends, which would be disastrous. It 
would lessen the disparity, and this is all that reasonably can be hoped for in 
any proposal. 
The method would be easy to apply. It requires only that the book amount of 
shareholders' equity, as shown in the company's accounts, be adjusted for the 
differences between taxable income and income as reported in the financial state-
ments. The differences already appears in the company's accounts. although ordi-
narily not in the shareholders' equity section. The tax deductible amount would 
be found simply by applying the prescribed rate to the shareholders' equity. The 
corporation would continue to pay an income tax on the net after this deduction. 
What effect would this proposal have on tax revenues? Taken by itself, a de-
duction for equity interest would of course reduce total revenue from income 
98-184 0 - 77 - 4 
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taxes. This is the case with all the proposals to alleviate the double taxation 
problem, and responsible advocates of any propo~al recognize the necessity of 
an offsetting change so that the total tax take would not be reduced. The various 
offsets that have been proposed can be applied with the proposal made here. 
Mr. OzLEY. In his recently published study of venture capital, Prof. 
Patrick Liles of the Harvard Business School pointed out that "various 
schemes to provide sources of financing for small and new businesses 
have been part of a recurring economic and political debate since the 
early 1930's." 
Professor Liles summarized the different proposals put forth be-
tween 1932 and 1958 when the Small Business Investment Act was 
passed by Congress and signed by President Eisenhower. Throughout 
that quarter century, almost every serious commentator agreed that 
an equity gap existed for new and small businesses, but found more 
difficulty in assigning dollar figures to the extent of the shortage. 
While this act has at least recognized the problem and taken a step 
toward curing it, we feel the equity gap still exists and from personal 
experiences, I can assure you there is a dire need for capital on the 
part of almost all small businesses in this country as well as new and 
emerging businesses. 
Even today, it is possible to argue that there is no equity gap. I 
suppose the true disciple of Adam Smith would say that the free 
market would take care of the truly good investment opportunity-and 
that any business unable to find capital is not a qualified applicant. 
I am afraid I must dispute the wisdom of Adam Smith in this re-
gard. I know from experience that this unique government-private en-
terprise undertaking we call the SBIC industry has provided financing 
for tens of thousands of worthy entrepreneurs who had no other source 
of dollars. 
My own SBIC has stepped up and disbursed venture capital to a 
small businessman after all the traditional suppliers were tried un-
successfully. Many of these SBIC financings have turned out well, 
too-belying the conclusion that good applicants can always find the 
money they need without help from a Government-sponsored program. 
NASBIC has tried to put some sort of numbers on the size of the 
equity gap, but we have not been successful. "\iVe can point to the $1.5 
billion raised through public stock offerings in 1969 by 548 small 
businesses going public for the first time and contrast it to the $16 
million raised by the four small firms which went public in 1975 and 
conclude that the intrinsic need could not have dropped so sharply in 
that 6-year period. · 
We all know that it costs more today to sta1t a business and that it 
requires more to turn it into a profitable operation. We know that re-
tained earnings remain the chief source of capital for small busi-
nesses-and that present tax laws take away more of the earnings of 
businesses than was the case before World War II. 
Finally, we know that the Federal tax laws give little or no incen-
tive for individuals to invest in small businesses-and other Federal 
laws all but prohibit institutional investment in smaller firms. For all 
these reasons, we can safely infer that the equity gap remains. 
In addition, we have strong empirical evidence that thousands of 
new businesses would be formed and that thousands of other present 
concerns would grow significantly if they had access to equity capital. 
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We point to those areas of the United States where there is a con-
centration of equity capital and find a record of birth and growth of 
businesses which is far above the national norm. 
I don't think we should conclude that all the brains and all of the 
entrepreneurial drive just happen to reside around route 128 outside 
Boston or in Santa Clara County in California or several other similar 
communities. 
No, I am certain that businesses are born and grow in those places, 
because equity capital sources are available there. 
To conclude this brief discussion of the existence of an equity gap, 
I would like to quote from an address presented to the NASBIC 
annual meeting in November 1976. Mitchell Kobelinski, then Admin-
istrator of SBA and a member of President Ford's Economic Policy 
Board, told us that his agency had worked with data supplied by all 
parts of the Government and said: "We estimate that small busmess 
faces a shortfall in venture and working capital that will average 
from $7 billion to $8 billion a year over the next decade." 
Are SBIC resources sufficient to fill the equity gap? 
Our answer to that question is certainly negative. We know that 
SBIC's have been disbursing equity and loan funds over the past 5 or 
6 years at an annual rate of between $125 million and $200 million. 
The SBA statistics indicate that equity investments constitute be-
tween 50 percent and 60 percent of the annual total, with the rest in the 
form of straight loans. 
Based on Mr. Kobelinski's estimate, it is apparent that the unfilled 
demand is sufficient to require a major growth in the size of present 
SBIC's and the addition of many large SBIC's to the program. As 
you know, there are now about 275 active SBIC's with private capital 
approaching; $450 million and total assets standing at about the $1 
billion level. 
Although the statistics on activities of non-SBIC venture capital-
ists are not available, we estimate that they disburse less annually than 
do the SBIC's. Thus, both segments of the venture capital industry 
fall far short of meeting the demands posed by the equity gap. 
Why hasn't the SBIC mdustry grown more rapidly? 
If we conclude that the equity gap remains with significant numbers 
of qualified applicants for SBIC-type financing- and that the SBIC 
industry is not large enough now to meet those demands, then we must 
ask why our industry has not grown to fill the gap. 
The answer is simple: The SBIC industry just has not been profita-
ble enough to attract more private dollars. 
SBA requires financial reports from all SBIC's each year, compiles 
those numbers, and makes them public. By and large, the consolidated 
financial reports for SBIC's make sad reading. The annual rates of 
return on investment have never been very high, and, worse, in many 
years, the industry has shown a negative return on its private capital. 
Natnrally, within those overall fignres, much is hidden. Some 
SBIC's have been able to compile outstanding; performance records 
with high realized earnings or annual gains in net asset values. 
In total, though, the profit rates, even over a long period, have 
been too low to encourage additional investors to join our important 
undertaking. 
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What is to be done? NASBIC's leadership has devoted almost all 
its time and resources for the past 6 months to come up with answers 
to that question. In April, the Association's Board of Governors gave 
its approval to a 20-point legislative and regulatory program to re-
vitalize not only the SBIC program, but the entire small business 
community as well. 
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert our 
position paper in your hearing record at this point. 
Mr. LAF ALCE. Without objection, it will be included. 
[The document referred to follows:] 
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"TO REVITALIZE SMALL BUSINESS" 
Irving Kristel spoke to the hearts of 10-million American 
entrepreneurs last Fall when he wrote in the Wall Street Journal 
that "a whole new class of forgotten men has emerged -- the small 
businessmen". Professor Kristel granted that "small business is of 
lesser economic significance than it used to be, but its economic 
role is still terribly important" and "small business preeminently 
is the private sector." He concluded that the survival of small 
business in the United States, despite its crucial role in innovation 
and job creation, is much in doubt today "and much that is precious 
to the American way of life will perish" if the independent sector 
dies. 
Viewed solely as a series of statistics, small business 
remains a major factor in our economy. There are almost 10-million 
of us who generate about 43% of the total Gross National Product 
and employ 55% of the business work force. On the other hand, the 
predominance of major corporations has increased tremendously over 
the past four or five decades. The Fortune 500 are the firms which 
hold the bulk of all manufacturing assets and which almost exclusively 
can tap the public securities markets and the growing resources of 
institutional lenders and investors. With heavy tax burdens and an 
inability to raise external funds, small and medium size businesses 
find it almost impossible to grow. Furthermore, they cannot innovate 
with those new products and services which would keep our economy 
truly competitive. 
Almost nineteen years ago, Congress passed the Small 
Business Investment Act which contained this statement: "It is 
declared to be the policy of the Congress and the purpose of this 
Act to improve and stimulate the national economy in general and 
the small business segment thereof in particular by establishing a 
program to stimulate and supplement the flow of private equity capital 
and long-term funds which small business concerns need for the sound 
financing of their business operations and for their growth, expansion 
and modernization ... 11 
The first SBICs were licensed by the Small Business Admin-
istration in March 1959. Currently, 275 SBICs are in operation 
with private capital of almost $425-million and assets approximating 
$1-billion. During the past 18 years, SBICs have disbursed almost 
$3-billion to some 50,000 new and growing small businesses. 
Taken alone, those numbers are rather impressive for such 
a pioneering industry, but they must be viewed in a broader per-
spective. Let's contrast those figures with the dollars raised by 
small business which went public for the first time in 1969. In that 
year alone, some 700 businesses with net worth under $5-million sold 
public offerings ot stock for the first time and raised $1.4-billion 
that's almost half as much as SBICs have disbursed throughout the 
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history of the program. Of course, the "hot new issues" market 
folded in the mid-1970's and in 1975, only 4 small businesses 
were able to go public and they raised a total of $16- million. With 
an annual disbursement rate of under $200-million, SBICs were not 
able to pick up the slack caused by the end of the public issues 
market -- let alone fill the other categories of the "equity gap" . 
NASBIC is convinced that this is the year for a thorough 
analysis of the current health of the independent sector of the 
American free enterprise system -- and that the vigor of the venture 
capital and SBIC industries is completely intertwined with the 
vital signs of the small business community. 
During the past year, several significant studies bearing 
upon the vitality of small business were completed. The Council of 
Small and Independent Business Associations (COSIBA} designed and 
drafted a comprehensive Federal tax bill which would dramatically 
bolster the survival and growth potential of independent business . 
At the same time, a Task Force on Equity and Venture Capital appointed 
by the Administrator of SBA issued a dramatic report containing 
recommendations in that area. Also during 1976 , the Secretary of 
the Treasury appointed an Advisory Committee on Small Business Eco-
nomic Policy which agreed on a wide-ranging series of proposal s to 
strengthen smaller firms. Finally, the National Venture Capital 
Association issued a White Paper entitled "Emerging Innovative 
Companies -- an Endangered Species." These are several of the blocks 
upon which this study is built. 
Herbert Krasnow was elected NASBIC President on November 3, 
1976; he immediately called upon the Association ' s Board of Governors 
to suggest changes in the design and operations of the SBIC program 
which would make it more effective in channel ing additional billions 
of dollars to hundreds of thousands of new and growing businesses. 
The NASBIC Board of Governors and its Executive Committee 
have now concluded the first phase of their survey and, in this paper, 
introduce their proposals for strengthening the SBIC industry. 
ASSUMP'l'ION8 
We start with two basic assumptions, but the two are inter-
related. First of all, we are convinced that American business in 
1977 confronts an "equity gap". Smaller firms this year , as always, 
are last in line when scarce equity capital is doled out, so any 
general shortage impacts most heavily on the new and the small. We 
know that present SBICs cannot meet all the requirements for venture 
capital and long-term loans. Furthermore, we are certain that no 
adequate non- SBIC sources of such dollars exist to augment SBIC 
funding. The public securities markets are all but closed to small 
issues; insurance companies and other institutional sources of capital 
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and credit can seldom be tapped by the owner-managers of independent 
businesses. The SBA bank guaranteed program is an important asset 
for small business, but it does not attack the equity capital short-
age. 
For all these reasons, and others, we must conclude that 
SBIC resources are insufficient to meet the demand posed by qual-
ified companies. If that is the case, why has supply not increased 
enough to meet the demand? This brings us to NASBIC's second as-
sumption: present SBICs have not been profitable enough to attract 
the capital and the loans they need to grow -- nor has the record of 
profitability been sufficient to bring enough new SBICs into the 
program. 
These then, are the basic assumptions upon which our pro-
posals are based: (1) the equity gap remains, so the SBIC program 
must be larger, but (2) it has not demonstrated rates of profit 
which would bring more private dollars and more companies into the 
industry. 
I. INCREASING SBIC PROFITABILITY 
During the history of the program, some SBICs have been able 
to compile outstanding performance records with superlativ e Tealized 
earnings or annual gains in net asset values. On the other hand, 
the overall ·industry record has been far less satisfactory . SBA 
issues an annual compilation of SBIC financial statements a nd the 
red-ink years have outnumbered those where profitability was the 
norm. Furthermore, in today's world, quick capital gain s appear to 
be only a fond memory. Few small or medium sized firms are able to 
go public -- and even when they do, the venture capitalists which 
backed them can seldom sell their shares. In addition, the merger 
fever has abated, so the fast-growing innovative firm no longer can 
sell out at 100 times earnings to the hot conglomerate. 
So -- it's back to fundamentals for SBIC managers; they, too, 
must try to cover their expenses and make their earnings on the spread 
between their cost of money and the price they charge for it. 
It should be noted at this point that SBIC activities have 
resulted in a significant profit for the Federal Government. Uncle 
Sam's return on its investments in the SBIC program has been far 
better than have been the prof its garnered by SBIC shareholders them-
selves. 
During the past 10 years, SBICs have been paying between 
7% and 9% for the leverage they obtain from the Small Business 
Administration. With that basic cost added to the licensee's 
expenses and reserves, it's apparent there is little room for profit. 
With full recognition of that fundamental fact, NASBIC makes this 
first, and most important recommendation: 
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A. The Federal Government should partially off set the 
cost of leverage, so SBICs will not have to pay more 
than 3% annual interest for new leverage. 
For every leveraged SBIC, the cost it must pay for its 
borrowings is the highest expense item on its P&L. If these 
borrowed funds were less costly, the SBIC will surely be able to 
show a better profit picture . Moreover, it would be able to make 
many loans and investments which are not feasible today with 
the significantly higher cost of money. 
If the Small Business Investment Act is amended to permit 
this subsidized leverage for regular SBICs, the Federal Government 
will bear a cost which is not directly offset by SBICs. On the 
other hand, that expense will be more than repaid by the additional 
taxes paid by the small businesses which receive the SBIC loans and 
investments and by the thousands of new employees added by SBIC 
portfolio companies. Official SBA surveys have proven that the 
Federal Government obtains tremendous dividends from the current 
operations of the SBIC program; even with the initial cost of sub-
sidized leverage, the Government will receive millions of added 
dollars in taxes from the accelerated and expanded pace of SBIC 
activity under the new plan. 
We believe the program for subsidized leverage should be 
in addition to the current SBA-Federal Financing Bank funding plan , 
rather than a substitute for it . The SBIC industry remembers all 
too well the chaos created by the unavailability of leverage during 
the first 12 years of the program when SBA and SBICs depended upon 
directly appropriated funding . 
B . Defer capital gains taxes when proceeds of the sale 
of stock issued by a small business are reinvested 
in an eligible small business concern . 
The greatest moment in the life of a venture capitalist 
comes when he is able to generate hard dollars through the sale 
of his long-held stock (usually about 10 years} of a successful 
portfolio company . That ' s the culmination of rigorous analysis of 
a promising investment opportunity, proper structuring and pricing, 
continuous counseling, and an imaginative exit technique on the 
part of the SBIC manager or other investor . Less exciting, though , 
is the heavy burden of Federal and State taxation which will take 
away about 50% of the capital gain so generated. There's a contra-
diction in this situation : the Federal Government has established 
and encouraged the SBIC program as a matter of public policy to 
provide capital to small business, but the same Government decimates 
the flow of such funds through the imposition of onerous taxation. 
Undoubtedly, one of the worst threats to the continuation of 
the free enterprise system is contained in the Internal Revenue Code. 
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Dur tax law permits tax-free reorganizations which provide an 
irresistible incentive for the owners of a successful small business 
concern to sell out to a major corporation, since there is no 
immediate tax consequence of such a merger, so long as they take the 
stock of the big business in return. This provision of the Code 
lessens competition and compromises the free market system. 
To offset this serious danger, NASBIC strongly urges that the 
tax law be made at least neutral. We propose an amendment to the 
Code which would encourage further investment in other small businesses. 
Taxation of capital gains arising from the sale of stock in a business 
firm which was ·small when the security was acquired, would be deferred 
when the proceeds of that sale were reinvested in a small business 
concern within a two-year period. There is a clear precedent for this 
amendment, both in the current corporate reorganization section and 
in the deferral of taxes on the sale of a residence. 
C. Allow all SBICs to pass through their earnings to 
their shareholders without the imposition of a 
corporate tax. 
It is our goal to attract different types of investors to 
the SBIC program. To those who are particularly interested in 
capital appreciation through the growth of the SBIC, the capital gains 
provision outlined above is especially attractive. Other investors, 
though, have the need or desire for current income, so they would 
be more likely to invest in SBICs which pay regular dividends. At 
the present time, publicly-owned SBICs which are registered under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 may avoid corporate taxes on their 
earnings so long as they pass through at least 90% of their profits 
to their shareholders. This authority has proven to be most valuable 
to several of the public SBICs which have increased their private 
capitalizations regularly over the life of the program. 
We believe that all SBICs should be given this authority 
whether or not they are publicly-owned. Although this position 
may appear at first blush to contradict our goal of bringing more 
capital to the program (since earnings will be distributed, not 
retained), we are certain that the payment of regular dividends 
will indeed attract many millions of dollars of new capital to 
those SBICs which are primarily income-oriented and, thus, able to 
pay such dividends to their shareholders. Present SBICs will get 
the new capital they need to grow and new SBICs will be formed, we 
are sure, if the pass-through provision is approved. 
D. Provide a statutory loss reserve of 10% for SBICs 
based upon equities, as well as debt securities. 
No matter how we redesign the SBIC program, one· constant 
will remain: the high level of risk involved in providing financial 
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assistance to new and small businesses. Over the past 18 years, 
SBICs have grown more skillful in screening out the doomed investments 
and in protecting themselves against losses, but every SBIC will 
inevitably have to swallow its share of complete or partial losses. 
At present, the Internal Revenue Code permits an SBIC to set up a 
reserve for bad debts based upon its experience , but this author-
ization is seriously deficient in two respects: first, for an 
SBIC, the past is no certain guide to the future. An SBIC may be 
fortunate enough to have minimal losses for 10 or 12 years and 
then it may have two or three deals go sour in a very short period. 
We believe it would make good business sense for the SBIC to set 
aside a reserve to take care of such unexpected losses. The second 
problem with the current law is that it allows for losses only on 
loans and not on investments, even though the latter are ordinarily 
far more risky. The NASBIC proposal then , would have the law 
permit any SBIC to establish a reserve against losses in an amount 
up to 10% of its total portfolio, both loans and investments. Here 
again, the change would encourage further equity investments. 
These four specific recommendations would make a significant 
contribution to the profitability of SBICs and we are certain they 
would encourage hundreds of millions of additional dollars to come 
into the.SBIC program, both into existing licensees and into new ones. 
The major beneficiaries of these changes, however, would be: (1) 
new and growing small businesses; (2) the Federal Government which 
would reap greatly expanded taxes from the small businesses assisted 
by SBICs and from the new workers employed by those growing firms; 
and, (3) the economy wpich would receive new products and services 
at lower prices through increased competition. 
II. PROVIDING START-UP CAPITAL FOR NEW BUSINESSES 
If venture capital is in short supply for growing businesses, 
it is all but non-existent for new concerns. Of course, the savings 
of the would-be entrepreneur and his family can be invested today, 
as always, but in almost every field of endeavor, the ante for 
getting into operation is far higher than it used to be. Henry Ford 
may have started an automobile company in his garage, but today's 
innovator can seldom take the boot-strap route. 
More typical in 1977 is the record of such firms as Cray 
Research, Amdahl Computer, or Federal Express. For these businesses 
to proceed from concept to market required tens of millions of dollars 
provided by many institutional venture capitalists. We are aware 
of these three companies, because they are the striking examples of 
high stakes start-ups which were funded and are now in business. 
On the other hand, no one knows the names of the thousands of equally 
innovative entrepreneurs who possessed similar expertise, but whose 
dreams never proceeded beyond the drawing boai:ds. 
.. 
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The still-birth of these companies is a vital factor in our 
national economy. They could have brought new products or new ser-
vices to the United States. They would have produced gre ater com-
petition and lower prices; and they would certainly have generated 
meaningful jobs for thousands of our citizens who are now unemployed 
or under-employed at the present time. A study undertaken for the 
Department of Commerce by the M.I.T. Development Fund gives dramatic 
proof of the benefits generated by new, high-technology firms. The 
M.I.T. survey focused on six mature companies; five innovative 
companies; and five young, high-technology firms. Here is the average 
annual record of each group for the five years between 1969 and 
1974: (1) the mature companies showed an annual sales growth of 
11.4%, but those sales increases were accomplished with an average 
growth in employment of only 0.6%; (2) the successful, innovative 
firms grew slightly faster, or 13.2% a year during the period; (3) 
BUT, for the new high technology firms, the average annual sales 
growth was 42.5% and the increase in employment averaged 40.7% each 
year. Quite obviously, the United States has a major stake in the 
formation of such firms. 
Although SBICs . have financed a number of start-ups each 
year, they are finding it increasingly difficult to justify the 
higher risk, the greater costs, and the lengthy locked-in period 
which inevitably accompany investments in new businesses. For all 
those reasons, NASBIC makes the following recommendation: 
The Federal Government should share in the higher 
risks associated with start-up investments. In such 
situations, the Government should guarantee 75% of 
the losses incurred by SBICs on start-up situations. 
We are certain that this risk-sharing will encourage SBICs 
to devote a higher percentage of their assets to the formation of 
new business. At the present time, the risk-reward ratio is so un-
favorable that SBIC management can justify only a very few start-
up investments. The proposed 75% guarantee will alter the risk-
reward ratio sufficiently to convince SBICs to disburse a larger 
percentage of their dollars in the form of true equity for start-
up. On the other hand, enough of the SBIC's investment will remain 
at risk to ensure that it will bend every effort to keep the new 
business solvent. Incidentally, it should be noted that the 
guarantee will not reimburse SBICs for the added costs associated 
with start-up investments. 
It would not be difficult to define a "start-up" business 
for purposes of this proposal. NASBIC makes these suggested criteria: 
(1) any firm (or related enterprise performing similar activity) which 
has not been in existence for more than one year; OR (2) any firm 
which has been in existence for less than five years and meets these 
two criteria: (a) never had annual revenues in excess of $250,000 
and (b) never has had a profit; OR (3) any firm which is determined 
as a "start-up" by the Small Business Administration. 
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We believe that this rather dramatic change in the SBIC 
format is fully justified by the significant role that new businesses 
have played in the American economy -- and can play in the future. 
This sharing of risks will bring new products, new services, new 
employment, and new processes to the Nation; it will increase com-
petition and lower prices. It represents a high-priority investment 
in the future of our free enterprise system. 
III. FLEXIBILITY FOR SBICS 
In its review of the present design of the SBIC program, 
the Association identified nine specific statutory and regulatory 
changes which would significantly assist licensees in providing 
more financial assistance to more small business concerns. None 
of these proposed amendments to laws or regulations are new (we 
have pressed for all of them for a number of years) and none would 
require any ·expenditures or increased obligations by the Federal 
Government. None alone would dramatically augment the size or 
activity of the SBIC industry, but together they would result in the 
channeling of additional millions of dollars annually to thousands 
of new and growing independent businesses. 
The first five proposals are directed at the Small Business 
Administration and we believe none of the changes should present 
any great difficulty for the policy makers at that Agency. 
A. SBA should promulqate liberalized size standards 
for firms to become eligible for SBIC assistance. 
Despite all the changes in the real world, SBA size standards 
are little changed from the formulas set 18 years ago. In the early 
1960's, thousands of new and small businesses were able to go to Wall 
Street for additional capital; today, that path is closed for all but 
the largest and most profitable companies. Nonetheless, the SBA size 
standards would lead one to believe that nothing has changed. Eighteen 
years ago, the costs for getting into business -- or the expenditures 
required for a firm to expand from a local to a national market --
were far lower than they are today. Throughout this period, the Amer~ 
ican economy has proceeded much farther down the road toward concen-
tration of sales, assets, and economic power. In 1977, there is a 
well-defined and broad "no-man's-land" where businesses are too big 
to receive SBIC help, but still much too small to obtain capital from 
the public or from other institutional sources. 
For all of these reasons, NASBIC proposes the following 
changes in the SBA size standards for SBIC financing purposes: 
1. The financial size standards should be raised to $15-
million in assets, $7.5-million of net worth, and an 
average annual pretax profit for the past two years of 
$2-million. 
• 
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2. The employment criteria should be doubled. 
3. The gross revenues tests for specific industries 
should be reexamined and revised upward to a 
level appropriate to today's economic conditions. 
4 . SBA should create a mechanism for regularly reviewing 
the SBICI size standards to compensate for inflationary 
and economic changes. 
5. SBA should establish size criteria for new industries 
on a timely basis. 
B. SBA should recognize non-cash gains as earnings 
of SBICs. 
In the days of a hot over-the-counter stock market, SBICs 
were usually able to sell off the stock they held in successful 
portfolio companies. That is seldom possible today, and the SBIC 
often sells that appreciated stock to the business itself or some 
other purchaser who will give a note for a part of the purchase 
price. Tax law recognizes such a sale as a taxable event; CPAs 
recognize that sale as giving rise to a gain by the SBIC; only 
SBA pretends that nothing happens until the SBIC has cash in hand. 
NASBIC believes that SBA's position is erroneous. We 
understand ·that SBA is wary of sham transactions where co-conspir-
ators fix inflated prices on small business securities and try to 
defraud the Government. NASBIC cannot guarantee that unscrupulous 
people will never try this ruse, but we feel strongly that regulations 
·should be based upon the strength of rational economic policy, rather 
than solely upon the fear of fraud. Furthermore, we point out that 
any such deceit already falls under the Federal criminal code. In 
addition , non- cash gains would not be recognized by SBA until they 
are specifically certified by an independent accountant. 
After studying this subject at length, NASBIC recommends 
that only debt instruments should be eligible to be recognized 
for SBA purposes as non-cash gains. The fluctuation of equity 
prices would raise aduitional problems. 
This revision in present SBA policies is important; the 
recognition of non-cash gains would bring more money into the SBIC 
program ; it would qualify for additional leverage, and would 
increase the legal lending limit of all SBICs having such gains. 
c. SBA should amend its control regulation . 
On at least four occasions during the past 18 years, SBA 
has revised its regulation dealing with the presumption of control 
by an SBIC over a portfolio company. At the present time, when the 
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SBIC and the owner-manager each own 50% of the voting stock, SBA 
considers that the SBIC is presumed to have "control"; in earlier 
years, such a stand-off was not considered control. 
This is a particularly important matter for SBICs which 
specialize in providing venture capital to new small businesses. 
In such cases, the SBIC ordinarily provides the bulk of the fi-
nancing and believes that its interests would be best protected 
by a SO-SO stock ownership. NASBIC seeks a full SBA review of 
the present policy and points out that such an amendment to the 
present regulations would encourage more investments of the very 
type which SBA itself is seeking. 
D. SBA should permit SBICs to augment their private 
capital structure through the sale of capital notes. 
At present, SBICs are allowed to include as private capital 
only funds raised through the sale of stock. We are certain that 
some individuals and institutions would be willing to commit dollars 
to SBICs, but would prefer to purchase SBIC capital notes, rather 
than stock. Other financial institutions have increased their size 
through the sale of such notes, and we believe that SBICs should 
also be given that authority. Under appropriate conditions, sub-
ordinated funds raised by SBICs in this manner should qualify for 
leverage and should be considered in the calculation of a licensee's 
legal loan limit. 
E. Give the SBIC program an Associate Administrator at SBA. 
From 19S8 through 1972, the SBA official responsible for 
SBICs was the Associate Administrator for Investment; his duties 
encompassed only the SBIC and development company programs. Since 
1972, that Associate Administrator has been known as the Associate 
Administrator for Finance and Investment and has been assigned the 
duties of heading up all of SBA's varied financial assistance 
programs -- which differ greatly from the SBIC concept. This down-
grading of SBICs at SBA has been r e flected in the lower priority 
given urgently-needed revisions in the laws, ~egulations, and 
policies relating to our program. NASBIC strongly endorses the 
assignment of an Associate Administrator responsible only for SBICs; 
we know that such an official will enable our industry to serve 
better the small business community. 
F. SBICs should be able to invest in Subchapter S firms. 
For at least a dozen years, NASBIC has sought statutory 
authority for SBICs to invest in Subchapter s firms. Now small 
businesses electing Subchapter s treatment lose that break when an 
SBIC (or any investor not an individual) purchases its stock. We 
have found no opposition to the idea, since it would make more firms 
• • 
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eligible for help from SBICs. On the other hand, neither Congress 
nor the Administration has given a high enough priority to the con-
cept to obtain its passage. They should this year. If SBICs could 
be shareholders in a Subchapter S corporation, this would redound to 
the benefit of many small businesses, and would contribute to the 
health of the SBIC industry as well. 
G. Exempt publicly-owned SBICs from the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. 
At one time, there were some 50 SBICs registered under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 and these publicly-owned SBICs 
accounted for the great majority of all private dollars committed 
to the industry. In 1977, only 14 publicly-traded SBICs are still 
in business and their private capital is a small fraction of the 
1963 total. 
NASBIC has spent many thousands of hours and many thousands 
of dollars trying to gain administrative relief from the '40 Act 
which would allow venture capital oriented SBICs to operate effectively 
and efficiently under SEC regulations. We are convinced that no mean-
ingful relief is corning from the Commission, so we strongly urge Con-
gress to exempt publicly-owned SBICs from the strictures of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 and combine all necessary regulation of SBICs 
under SBA. 
H. Liberalize Rule 144, so SBICs will be able to cash 
in on their winners. 
Rule 144 is another obstacle to the SBIC-venture capital 
industry. With the virtual shut-down of the new issues market, most 
SBICs are able to realize capital gains only through sales of the 
stock of successful portfolio companies under Rule 144. The cur-
rent version of that Rule is seriously deficient for SBICs and should 
be amended in two important respects: first, the volume limitation 
should be doubled, so SBICs will be able to sell up to 1% of the out-
standing stock of the issuer in a three-month, rather than six-month 
period. The second change would free for sale all the unregistered 
stock of a qualifying company after the SBIC or venture capital com-
pany had held it for five years. 
I. Amend Rule 146 so it will be more useful to small 
firms making private offerings. 
The SEC's Rule 146 spelled out the conditions under which a 
business could sell unregistered stock by utilizing specific criteria 
of a private offering placement. Although the Rule has clarified a 
number of points, it has several weaknesses which vitiate its useful-
ness to small business. NASBIC has recently written the Commission 
urging amendments to the Rule which would make it more valuable. 
.. 
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IV. GIVING A BETTER BREAK TO SMALL BUSINESS GENERALLY 
Up to this point, we have concentrated on those items which 
would directly benefit the profitability and the operating effectiveness 
of the SBICs themselves. In this final section of our report, we shall 
propose a number of recommendations (largely of changes in various laws) 
which will greatly strengthen the independent sector of our economy 
and buttress the position of individual small business concerns. 
A. Congress should pass the COSIBA Tax Bill. 
The Council of Small and Independent Business Associations 
has drafted a comprehensive tax bill which would significantly lessen 
the adverse impact of present Federal tax laws on new and small busi-
nesses. NASBIC reaffirms its support f or a ll 18 of the provisions 
of the COSIBA bill, but wishes at this time to stress the particular 
importance of three features of that measure: (1) the job creation 
credit which would encourage smaller firms to employ additional 
workers through a tax credit; (2) a graduated corporate income tax 
structure which would permit smaller firms to retain a larger portion 
of their earnings for reinvestment in the business; and (3) a liber-
alized and simplified depreciation schedule which could be utilized 
by smalle r companies. 
B. Present ca~ital gains taxation removes much of 
the incentive to invest. The trend must be 
reversed. 
The COSIBA tax bill contains a section revising current 
capital gains taxes, but we believe this item is so important it 
should be mentioned separately. During the past several years, 
Congress has skewed the tax laws even more strongly in favor of 
consumption and borrowing , and against savings and investment. 
The Nation will inevitably suffer from this short-sighted action, 
since our productive plant is significantly older than that of other 
industria lized countries. In addition, the new provisions of law 
(e .g., the tax on pr e fer e nce income) remove much of the incentive 
f or persons to invest in any business, but particularly in riskier 
small companies. NASBIC places a high priority on statutory 
changes which would encourage citizens to invest their dol l ars in the 
modernization and expansion of the American industrial plant and 
in the greater utilization of technological innovation. 
C. Executives of small businesses should be allowed 
qualified stock options. 
Unde r the guise o f "loophole- closing ", recent amendments 
to the Inter nal Revenue Code have removed the attrac tivene ss of 
restricted stock options for managers of new and small businesses. 
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